FOREIGN PRESS REVIEW (FPR)

“This strategy is a statement of our fundamental values, highest priorities and orientation toward the future, but it is an action document as well,” said John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence. “For U.S. national intelligence, the time for change is now.”

The document sets forth the framework for a more unified, coordinated and effective Intelligence Community and was written in consultation with the relevant departments. Its publication coincides with the six-month anniversary of the establishment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).

Outlining the document’s two types of strategic objectives – mission and enterprise – the strategy recognizes each Intelligence Community member’s strengths and competencies.

“At its core, this National Intelligence Strategy capitalizes on the extraordinary talents and patriotism of America’s diverse intelligence professionals, those serving today and those joining us tomorrow,” Negroponte said. “It relies on our nation’s tradition of teamwork and technological innovation to integrate the work of our distinct components into collaborative success.”

The National Intelligence Strategy will guide Intelligence Community policy, planning, collection, analysis, operations, programming, acquisition, budgeting, and execution. These activities will be overseen by the ODNI, but implemented through an integrated Intelligence Community effort to capitalize on the comparative advantages of constituent organizations.

Fiscal Year 2008 Planning, Programming, and Performance Guidance will reflect the mission and enterprise objectives. Ongoing program and budget activities for Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 will adjust to these objectives to the maximum extent possible.

Mission Objectives

As detailed in this strategy, mission objectives relate to those efforts to predict, penetrate, and pre-empt threats to our national security and assist all who make and implement U.S. national security policy, fight our wars, protect our nation, and enforce our laws. Missions objectives outlined in the National Intelligence Strategy are:

• Defeat terrorists at home and abroad by disarming their operational capabilities, and seizing the initiative from them by promoting the growth of freedom and democracy.

• Prevent and counter the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

• Bolster the growth of democracy and sustain peaceful democratic states.

• Develop innovative ways to penetrate and analyze the most difficult targets.

• Anticipate developments of strategic concern and identify opportunities as well as vulnerabilities for decision-makers.

Enterprise Objectives

Enterprise objectives relate to our ability to transform faster than threats emerge, protect what needs to be protected, and perform our duties according to the law. Enterprise objectives in the National Intelligence Strategy are:

• Build an integrated intelligence capability to address threats to the homeland, consistent with U.S. laws and the protection of privacy and civil liberties.

• Strengthen analytic expertise, methods, and practices; tap expertise wherever it resides; and, explore alternative analytic views.

• Rebalance, integrate, and optimize collection capabilities to meet current and future customer and analytic priorities.

• Attract, engage, and unify an innovative and results-focused Intelligence Community workforce.

• Ensure that Intelligence Community members and customers can access the intelligence they need when they need it.

• Establish new and strengthen existing foreign intelligence relationships to help us meet global security challenges.

• Create clear, uniform security practices and rules that allow us to work together, protect our nation’s secrets, and enable aggressive counterintelligence activities.

• Exploit path-breaking scientific and research advances that will enable us to maintain and extend our intelligence advantages against emerging threats.

• Learn from our successes and mistakes to anticipate and be ready for new challenges.

• Eliminate redundancy and programs that add little or no value and re-direct savings to existing and emerging national security priorities.

In country after country in the former Soviet Union, people angered by rigged elections have toppled a string of entrenched, corrupt leaders. While their actions boosted prospects for democracy, Azerbaijan should not see this as a model to emulate when it goes to the polls in November.

Instead, Azerbaijan, that oil-rich country tucked in the southern Caucasus, should seize the opportunity to prove it can become a real democracy without revolution.

Revolutions are destructive. They may open the way for democratic reform but provide no guarantee. The popular uprisings in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan marked one step towards democratisation in those countries. But after the revolutionary euphoria dissipated, the politicians faced the arduous task of building democracy from scratch. ...

Azerbaijan can choose to avoid this fate. In a poor country blessed by natural wealth, the government already has moved to establish an oil fund to help ensure that citizens benefit from these resources. By doing so, the government signalled its apparent willingness to be accountable ...

So far such steps have failed to allay popular discontent fuelled by persistent poverty and limits on basic liberties. And as the election campaign gets under way, some believe that Azerbaijan will be the next country in the Caucasus and central Asia to don the mantle of revolution. Segments of the opposition and ruling elite seem to be spoiling for a fight. But it is time to set in motion a process that renders revolution unnecessary. ...

The government must lift a ban on foreign funding of local election observers. It must also give citizens their right to protest. There remain key legal provisions and unofficial levers that enable the ruling New Azerbaijan Party to sway the elections. The party and its satellites dominate the central and local election committees; and some evidence suggests the government is using state resources to back favourites.

Another pillar of power for Mr Aliev's regime is the media. Most of Azerbaijan's 8m citizens get their information from state-controlled television. Not surprisingly, coverage brazenly favours pro-government candidates. ...

The playing field cannot be levelled overnight. But the government should take steps now - and after the elections - to make sure this happens. Azerbaijan's civil society clearly faces many obstacles. To progress, it must heal ­bitter internal divisions. With parliament potentially the keystone of democratic reform, civil society should work on voter education and encourage turn-out. The current controversy over exit polls in Azerbaijan underscores how crucial they are in delivering an ­accurate result.

Civil society must not be crippled by its own rancour. In tiny Azerbaijan, more than a dozen civil society coalitions vie for funds to work on the elections. ...

Outside actors - the US and the European Union - must deliver a tough message that Azerbaijan cannot get away with stealing the vote. Many believe the country was given a pass on the dirty 2003 poll because of its abundant oil reserves. The Council of Europe, which admitted Azerbaijan despite the blatant fraud of the 2000 elections, has failed to press for democratic reform. Azerbaijan has won kudos for pledging to uphold government transparency with its oil funds, but it means nothing if the elections are a sham.

New York'taki BM Milenyum Zirvesi'ne katılan Türk heyetinin ana gündem maddelerinden biri hiç kuşkusuz PKK'ydı. Daha zirve başlamadan, Amerikan Başkanı George W. Bush, Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'a "Irak Cumhurbaşkanı Celal Talabani'ye PKK konusunda bir şeyler yapmalısın" dediğini aktararak gönlünü almak istedi. Kimileri, bir şekilde medyaya yansıyan bu sözleri, "Ankara'nın başarısının kanıtı" olarak görürken, bazıları da "Washington topu Irak'a atıyor. Demek ki bir şey olmayacak" diye olumsuz yorumladı.
Başbakan Erdoğan, Dışişleri Bakanı Abdullah Gül ve kurmayları, Talabani ve Irak Başbakanı İbrahim Caferi ile aynı gün ama ayrı ayrı görüştü. AKP'li bir kurmay, görüşmeleri "Duymak istediğimiz her şeyi söylediler" diye değerlendirdi. "Peki ne yapmalarını bekliyorsunuz?" diye sorduğumuzdaysa "Tabii ki yapamayacakları şeyler var, ama yapabilecekleri şeyler de var" karşılığını verdi.

Lider kadroya operasyon
Peki Iraklılar ne yapabilir? PKK'yı topraklarından söküp atmaları mümkün değil. Hatta ABD'den bile böyle topyekun bir askeri operasyon beklenmiyor. ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı Irak Koordinatörü James Jeffrey, PKK'ya sıranın ancak Irak'taki direniş kırıldıktan sonra gelebileceğini biz Türk gazetecilere on gün önce verdiği brifingte açıkça dile getirmişti.
Jeffrey de Bush gibi, PKK ile mücadelede topu "Irak hükümeti" ne atmıştı. Iraklılar'ın elinde PKK liderlerinin listesinin olduğunu, bunların bir şekilde ele geçmesi durumunda "gereğinin yapılacağını" söylemişti.
Bu "liste" ilk kez Başbakan Erdoğan'ın Haziran ayındaki Beyaz Saray ziyareti sırasında, muhtemelen Türk askeri kaynaklar tarafından medyaya sızdırılmıştı. Aslında "Amerikan ordusu özel kuvvetleri hiç olmazsa örgütün lider kadrosuna karşı nokta operasyonları düzenlesin!" şeklinde özetlenebilecek bir öneri yaklaşık bir yıldır seslendiriliyor ve ara bir çözüm olarak taraftar topluyor. Bu görüşü ilk olarak Washington Enstitüsü'nün Türkiye programı yöneticisi Dr. Soner Çağaptay'ın savunduğuna tanık olmuş ve bunu haberleştirmiştim.
Fikir ilginç ve uygulanabilir gibiydi ama onca zamanda herhangi bir somut adım atılmadı. Bu arada 3 Ekim'in yaklaşmasını fırsat bilen PKK, Abdullah Öcalan'ı serbest bıraktırmak için yeniden silahlı eylemlere başladı. Karadeniz'e de açılmaya çalıştı. Dahası büyük şehirler ve turizm bölgelerinde sivilleri hedef alan "kör terör" saldırıları düzenledi. Bunların peşinden büyük kitle gösterileri gelince, Türkiye belki de ilk kez "Türk-Kürt çatışması" tehlikesinin eşiğine geldi.

ABD neden hevesli değil?
BM Zirvesi, PKK'ya karşı "polisiye operasyon" beklentilerini iyice tırmandırdı. Her an bir PKK yöneticisinin öldürüldüğünü veya yakalandığını duyabiliriz. Ama akla birçok soru geliyor.
*"Teröre karşı savaş" diyen Washington, terörist olarak gördüğü PKK'ya karşı neden "polisiye" mücadeleye bile hevesli görünmüyor?
*Irak Kürtleri, gerek genel kamuoyu, gerek yöneticiler olarak gerçekten PKK'nın tasfiyesini istiyorlar mı?
*Polisiye operasyonun sınırını kim, nasıl çizecek?
*Kimler hedef alınacak? Gerçekten örgütün beyinleri mi, yoksa etkisi kalmamış, hatta PKK'dan ayrılmış bazı meşhurlar mı?
*Bu formüle karşı PKK ne gibi tedbirler ve cevaplar hazırlamış olabilir?
*Örgütün muhtemel misillemelerine Türkiye ve Irak tam olarak hazır mı?
*Operasyonların ardından PKK'nın dağılması mı öngörülüyor?
*PKK yok olursa boşluğunu kim ya da kimler dolduracak?
Bu iş polisiye operasyonla olsaydı, Kürt sorununun 15 Şubat 1999'da çözülmüş olması gerekirdi.

I've never been a big fan of the Iraqi constitution project. Issues such as federalism and the role of Islam are simply too large and fundamental to be decided this early in Iraq's democratic evolution. It is more appropriately the work of years as Iraqis learn accommodation and tolerance and the other habits of self-government.

I wrote two months ago that forcing a resolution of Iraq's cosmic dilemmas by some arbitrary date could serve only to exacerbate existing divisions. This has indeed happened. Nonetheless, the Iraqi constitution project is a fact. It has produced a document. It goes to referendum on Oct. 15. And all the lamentations and rending of garments over the text are highly overblown.

The idea that it creates an Islamic theocracy is simply false. Its Islamist influence is relatively mild. Chapter One, Article One: "The Republic of Iraq is . . . a democratic, federal, representative [parliamentary] republic." The word Islamic is deliberately and importantly omitted.

More specifically, the rule of sharia is significantly constrained. All constitutions have their "thou shalts" and "thou shalt nots." In America, the Constitution proper says what the government can and should do. The Bill of Rights says what the government cannot and must not do -- impose religion, force confessions, search and seize. It is the "thou shalt nots" that are your protection from tyranny.

The constitution writers in Iraq finessed the question of Islam by posing it as a thou-shalt-not. No law may contradict Islam. But it also says that no law may contradict democratic principles and that the constitution accepts all human rights conventions.

This means that there are two gatekeepers for the passing of any law. Insofar as the constitution is adhered to -- a heretofore dubious assumption in that part of the world -- democratic rights are protected from the imposition of sharia. Establishing a double roadblock to new legislation is an excellent way to launch Iraq's first experiment with limited government.

In any case, the real Gordian issue was never Islam but federalism. The Sunnis object to devolving power away from Baghdad because they happen not to be sitting on oil and have spent the past century plundering everybody else's and turning villages such as Tikrit into monstrous treasure cities with the proceeds. With this constitution, that is going to stop. As it should. The only problematic proposal was for the Shiites to have the right to create a nine-province super-region as autonomous as Kurdistan.

That might establish de facto self-governing entities within the shell of a weak Iraqi central government. So what? The only major objection is that neighboring countries would vigorously reject a fully sovereign Kurdistan or Shiite "south Iraq." However, maintaining the shell of Iraqi sovereignty might mollify the Turks and Saudis and others who would resist outright independence. It might even turn out to be the best possible solution for Iraq's deep religious and ethnic divisions. After all, as one wag said, Iraq was created not by God but by Winston Churchill. And it was not one of his most blessed creations.

Moreover, a Basra-based Shiite super-region was not enshrined in the constitution. It is permitted, but not required. That question will be left to future parliaments. As it should be. Again, the cosmic problems of identity and the distribution of power should be deferred to legitimately elected parliaments as they develop the habits of democracy over time.

In the end, the Sunni representatives walked out. It would have been nice if the Shiites and Kurds had been more accommodating, though to expect such niceness from a majority population that had suffered for 30 years at the hands of a Tikriti gangster regime, rooted in the Sunni minority, is perhaps to expect too much.

Nor have the Sunnis acted in a way that might encourage such niceness. First they boycott the elections that would have given them a real say in the constitution-writing process. Then they support a murderous insurgency that is killing dozens of Shiites and Kurds every day, to say nothing of coalition troops. Then they demand a veto on the proposed constitution. Chutzpah.

We went into Iraq knowing that we were going to overturn the political order. The introduction of democracy would inevitably take power away from the former ruling community -- the 20 percent of the population that ruled with uncommon brutality -- and transfer it to the other 80 percent. That the previously victimized 80 percent should not wish to be held hostage to the political demands of their former oppressors should hardly be a surprise. Nonetheless, they still managed to produce a perfectly reasonable constitutional document that deserves far more respect than it has received from the knee-jerk critics here at home.

Irak’taki gelişmeler, belki orta ancak büyük olasılıkla uzun vadede, Kürtlerin Kuzey Irak’ta bağımsız veya konfederal bir devlet kurma şanslarının arttığını gösteriyor. Şimdiden buna hazırlıklı olmakta yarar var. Zira korkunun ecele faydası yok...

Belki bazılarımız olayın önemini ve vehametini görüyor, ancak Türk toplumunun büyük çoğunluğu, önümüzdeki yıllarda en çok Kuzey Irak’taki gelişmeleri tartışacağının farkında değil.

Hepimizin gündemi, kısa orta ve uzun vadede sadece Kuzey Irak Kürdistanı olacak.

Kuzey Irak Kürtleri müthiş planlama güçleriyle mi, yoksa konjonktür sayesinde yakaladıkları rüzgar ile mi bilinmez, tarihlerinin en büyük fırsatını yakaladılar.

Herşey, 1 inci Körfez savaşından (1991) bu yana onların istedikleri gibi gelişiyor. Programlasalar dahi bu kadarını elde edemezlerdi.

Şans yüzlerine güldü.

Doğrusu, onlar da durumun hemen farkına vardılar ve eski küçük hesaplarını bir kenara bıraktılar. Talabani ve Barzani kabile kavgalarını andıran ve dışarıya tamamen, kim hangi gümrük kapısından ne kadar rüşvet alacak kavgası izlenimini veren silahlı çatışmalarından vazgeçtiler. Birbirlerinden belki hala nefret ediyor olabilirler, ancak bir uzlaşı kültürü sergilediler.

Silahları bıraktılar... Birbirlerini öldürmekten vazgeçtiler ve uzlaştılar. İlerde birgün, farklı şekilde, birbirleri üzerinde üstünlük kurabilmek için tekrar mücadele edebilirler, ancak bugün son derece akıllı şekilde ortak hedeflerine doğru emin adımlarla ilerliyorlar.

Hedefleri de bağımsızlık.

Belki 10, belki 20, belki 30 yıl sonra olabilir, ancak sonunda ya bağımsız veya konfederal Irak’ın bir parçası olacaklar.

ŞANSLARI NE?

Irak’taki gelişmeler, Kuzey Irak kürtlerinin lehine.

Kısa vadede Amerikalılar Irak’ın bölünmesini kabul edemeyecekleri için, Kürtlerin bu aşamada büyük bir şansları yok. Anayasa taslağında da istediklerini elde edemediler. Ancak herşey yine de onların istediği gibi gelişiyor.

1. Şiiler, hem kendi aralarında, hem de Sunni’lerle boğaz boğazalar. Öylesine küçük düşünüyorlar, öylesine kişisel çıkarları için mücadele ediyorlar ki, sonunda büyük resmi göremeyecekler ve Irak’ın bölünmesine neden olacaklar.

2. Şii’ler ve Sunni’ler Amerikalılara karşı mücadelelerini sürdürecekler ve ABD sonunda Irak’ı kontrolünde tutabilmek için, Kuzey’e yerleşecek. Kürtler, Amerikalıların koruması altına girecek, en önemli müttefiği konumuna gelecek.

Özetle, Kürtler kazanacaklar...

Bunu da, daha çok Şii ve Sunni’lerin hesapsızlıklarından ve konjonktür sayesinde elde edecekler.

Görünen köy klavuz istemez.

Bu senaryo tam tersine de dönebilir.

Şii’ler kendi aralarında anlaşır ve uzun vadeli düşünüp hareket ederler. Konjonktür ters döner ve Irak’ı parçalamalarının uzun vadeli çıkarlarına zarar vereceğini görürler. İşte o zaman durum değişebilir.

Şii’ler henüz bu noktaya gelebileceklerini gösterecek bir işaret vermediler.

TÜRKİYE NE YAPABİLİR?

Türkiye bu durumda ne yapabilir?

Şii’lere akıl verebilir, ancak tüm grupları etkileyebilecek gücü yok. Her ne kadar Sunni’ler dahil herkese ulaşabiliyor olsak dahi, oradaki hesaplaşma çok farklı. Gelecek yıllarda Irak’ın kimler tarafından yönetileceğinden tutun da, Şii cemaati arasında kimin hakim olacağına kadar büyük bir hesaplaşma söz konusu. Kimsenin kimseyi dinleyecek hali yok.

Böyle bir durumda –özellikle uzun vadeli düşünürsek- Ankara kartlarını sizce nasıl oynamalı?

Şii’lerin kendi aralarındaki kavgaya mı müdahele etmeli?

Nasıl yapmalı?

Sunni’lerle mi yakınlaşmalı?

Yoksa kürtlerle ilişkilerine farklı bir bakış mı getirmeli?

Yarın bu konuya yanıt getirmeye çalışacağım...

Mideast Course At the Mercy of Local Factions

For all the attention and resources the Bush administration has poured into the Middle East, the outcome of its two most critical initiatives is increasingly vulnerable to the sectarian passions, tumultuous history and political priorities of the local players, say U.S. officials and regional experts.

Two developments over the past week marked major movement for the U.S. agenda: Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, a critical step in the creation of a Palestinian state and regional peace. And Iraq submitted a constitution to its national assembly, offering the legal foundation for a new Iraqi state.

...  But the actual implementation of Iraq's constitution and the viability of Gaza will now depend largely on forces beyond Washington's control -- and both face mounting challenges.

"The theme in this region is the reality of a foreign military power that comes in with great determination and overwhelming force, defeats people, subjugates a nation and then gets completely lost in the local maelstrom of interests and the irresistible force of indigenous identity -- religious, ethnic, sectarian, national. People act in a maniacal way when they assert these identities, which includes nurturing and protecting them," said Rami Khouri, a U.S.-educated Arab analyst and editor of Lebanon's Daily Star newspaper.

"Every single foreign power that has been in this region since Alexander the Great -- through the Romans, Greeks, Ottomans, British, French and now Americans -- has learned the same lesson," Khouri said.

.... Shiite parties did not quickly or fully appease Sunni concerns -- and Iraq missed its deadline for a third time on Thursday.

"The U.S. is shackled by the very forces that it liberated," said Robert Malley, the International Crisis Group's Middle East program director and a former Clinton administration National Security Council staff member.

"All those forces silenced during Saddam Hussein's rule are using a period of transition, when Iraq is remaking itself, to express themselves or gain advantage. Even though the United States is the dominant force, it is increasingly finding itself a bystander as Iraqis vie for power and to define what a future Iraq is going to be," Malley said.

The administration acknowledged yesterday that political transformations take time and often do not unfold evenly -- and that the outcome is far from guaranteed.

"If the Sunnis do vote for it and approve the constitution, if the constitution is not stopped, then it will be a national contract and it will help with the counter-insurgency strategy," Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, said yesterday on NBC's "Meet the Press." "If they don't, then it will be a problem."

Bush also acknowledged the split among Iraqis, which he described as a right of free individuals living in a free society. "We recognize that there is a split amongst the Sunnis, for example, in Iraq. And I suspect that when you get down to it, you'll find a Shiite in disagreement with a Shiite who supports the constitution, and perhaps some Kurds are concerned about the constitution," Bush said. "We're watching a political process unfold."

But rivalries over shaping that future in a free environment have also sparked tensions, even within sectarian factions. Despite the presence of more than 130,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, clashes erupted last week between two Shiite militias: Troops loyal to radical cleric Moqtada Sadr fought the Badr Organization of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

Militia wings of Iraq's political parties are "looking out for their own future" and will continue to "act in ways that strengthen them, politically and militarily," said Edward Walker, president of the Middle East Institute and former ambassador to Egypt and Israel. "They see themselves winning [over other groups] and now they're fighting to see who gets the biggest piece of the action. That puts the U.S. in a different position."

On Gaza, U.S. goals are likely to be heavily influenced over the next year by internal Israeli and Palestinian politics. Both Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon face significant political foes -- and critical elections.

The Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas, which already has a substantial base of support in Gaza, is increasingly challenging Abbas's authority. The competition between secular and religious parties will play out when Hamas runs for the first time in legislative elections in January.

Despite Israel's insistence, Abbas has refused to disarm Hamas's militia wing -- and is unlikely to take that unpopular move before the January voting. That, in turn, will hurt U.S. efforts to solidify security arrangements and then move forward on the U.S.-backed peace plan known as the roadmap.

Sharon is facing a revolt in his Likud Party over his controversial decision to withdraw from Gaza, with one poll showing him 17 percentage points behind former finance minister Binyamin Netanyahu among party supporters. Netanyahu quit the Sharon cabinet earlier this month in opposition to the Gaza decision. Elections are expected by November 2006.

As the Gaza withdrawal neared, Sharon moved to placate his right-wing base by pushing forward with construction of a security fence, slicing through Palestinian farmland, to encircle and protect the largest settlement on the West Bank. The move infuriated Palestinians and could undercut support for Abbas.

The administration deserved credit for working hard to make the Gaza withdrawal a success, said Shibley Telhami of the University of Maryland and the Brookings Institution, but "now it's clear everyone had not fully thought about the morning after." There is now a "huge gap in expectations," with the Israelis expecting a breather after last week's wrenching settler evictions from Gaza and the Palestinians expecting accelerated peace talks.

"Both sides are wrapped up in their own political dynamics," Telhami said. The Bush administration faces the challenge of "helping Sharon without hurting Abbas and helping Abbas without hurting Sharon."

Local economic and security priorities may also complicate the U.S. agenda. In creating a viable Gaza for 1.3 million Palestinians, the Palestinian focus is on building an economy that includes free flow of goods and people across the borders with Israel and Egypt. But Israel's primary focus is on security guarantees to ensure that extremists are unable to cross into Israel. ...

For the past year or so, President Bush has firmly opposed all talk of withdrawing troops from Iraq or even of setting a timetable for withdrawal, arguing that such plans would only encourage the insurgents to hold tight and wait for our departure.

Now, all of a sudden, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. George Casey, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, are openly speaking of "fairly substantial reductions" in the spring and summer of 2006.

What's happening?

First, there are the obvious factors. Domestic opposition to the war is rising; the latest polls show 55 percent of the American public thinks it's a bad idea and, further, has doubts we can win. It's a fair guess that top Republicans have approached the president or his henchmen to say they'd prefer that the war not be an issue in the 2006 congressional elections—and that it be off the table entirely by 2008.

It should also be clear, to all but the most rosy-eyed cheerleaders, that things are not going well in Iraq. When Vice President Dick Cheney harrumphed that the insurgents were in their "last throes," everyone—even his old pal, Rummy—had to cough and backpedal. It's a fair debate whether America's military presence is weakening the insurgency or swelling its ranks. (My own guess is both.)

Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld have said repeatedly—as have many critics of the war—that U.S. troops can't leave until the Iraqi security forces are sufficiently trained and equipped to fight off the insurgents and keep order.

This recent talk of withdrawal may have been sparked by the realization that almost no progress has been made in training Iraq's new soldiers—and that this is the case, in part, because the Iraqi government doesn't want them to be trained.

Last February, the Bush administration asked Congress for an $81.9 billion supplemental budget to fund operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Buried deep inside this 97-page document was a request of $5.7 billion for the "Iraq Security Fund." In justifying this sum, the document noted that the Iraqi government had created a security force of 90 battalions, adding:

All but one of these 90 battalions, however, are lightly equipped and armed, and have very limited mobility and sustainment capabilities.

In other words, by the administration's admission, only one Iraqi battalion was able to engage in a prolonged firefight.

Half a year later, the story has barely changed. A report to Congress by Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concludes that only "a small number" of Iraqi forces are capable of "taking on the insurgents and terrorists by themselves." By some estimates, this "small number" is as little as 5,000—only slightly more than the single battalion that could do the job last February.

For months, the administration has denied and disputed claims by Democratic critics—most notably Sens. Joe Biden of Delaware and Carl Levin of Michigan—that training was moving too slowly. It could well be that the evidence is now too obvious to ignore.

Lieut. Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. officer in charge of training the Iraqi forces, was transferred this month to take over the Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Petraeus, commander of the 101^st Airborne Division during the early phases of the war, is widely viewed as one of the Army's most creative and competent generals. It's not yet clear whether the transfer stems from Petraeus' frustration with the job or from Rumsfeld's dissatisfaction with his handling of it.

Either way, some of Petraeus' aides, if not the general himself, have recently learned of rumors that Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari doesn't want his army to be well-trained. A leading Shiite, Jaafari reportedly fears that if the U.S. troops leave Iraq, the insurgents will crush all resistance and hoist the Sunnis back to power. Since the Americans have said they will leave once the Iraqi security forces are self-sufficient, Jaafari figures it's best to keep that day at bay. This could explain why many Iraqi units lack such basic materials as reliable weapons, ammunition, and sufficient food and bedding gear.

One of Petraeus' aides hit the roof when he heard this rumor of Jaafari's recalcitrance a few weeks ago. This may be why Rumsfeld seemed more perturbed than usual after his meeting with Jaafari in Baghdad this week. It may be why, for the first time, he brought up the subject of eventually pulling out.

This is, in fact, the best reason for declaring a timetable—to force the Iraqi government to start taking their sovereignty seriously.

The withdrawal clock can't—and shouldn't—start ticking until after this December's election, when the Iraqis vote for a new government. (They voted in January for an interim government, which would draft a constitution. The constitution is supposed to be completed in August and ratified in October. This is another reason for Rumsfeld's agitation: Fundamental differences among Iraq's religious factions are threatening to push back the deadline, which would push back the next elections, which would delay—for who knows how long—the U.S. withdrawal.)

At that point, it may take another 18 months for the Iraqi security forces to be equipped and trained—assuming that, this time, the new government cooperates. So, under this scenario, the United States can start pulling out of Iraq, as Gen. Casey projected, by the spring or summer of 2006—and be out entirely by mid-2007.

This schedule would fit well with Republican election plans—and it's unlikely the Democrats would strenuously oppose the plan. (Do they want to bill themselves as the party in favor of prolonging the war?) It also has the virtue of being a good idea. If the Iraqi assembly hammers out a constitution, if the elections take place, if Sunnis take part and win a proportionate share of seats, then enough citizens may be sufficiently satisfied with the arrangement to undermine the insurgents' base of support and legitimacy—which is the key to all successful insurgencies.

And if none of these things happen, it will be time to ask whether the American troops in Iraq are serving any purpose, whether it makes any difference if they're back here or over there—and, if it makes no difference, to ask why they can't just come home.

... (Başbakan Erdoğan) Genelkurmay'ın geçen hafta ortaya attığı 1999'dan sonra PKK'ya katılan ve teröre bulaşmamış gençlere yönelik yeni bir af ya da pişmanlık yasasına sıcak bakmıyor. Daha önceki pişmanlık yasalarının bir sonuç getirmediğini anlatıyor. Yine Genelkurmay brifinginde gündeme gelen yeni bir terörle mücadele koordinasyon merkezi kurulmasına da karşı . "İlle de kurul oluşturmak şart değil. Biz mevcut mekanizmaları işletmekten yanayız. Ayrıca bilimsel bir çalışma başlattık. Terörün nedenleri ve çözüm yolları üzerine" diyor. ...

In today's global economy, any job can be performed anywhere. In order to compete in a global labour market, all students in advanced industrial countries need to be highly trained in science and mathematics. In order to compete in the global economy, the advanced industrial nations must downsize generous welfare states.

The above represents something like the conventional wisdom about the global economy, the future job market and the welfare state. There is only one problem: every assertion in the preceding paragraph is wrong.

Let us start with the first assertion: "In today's global economy, any job can be performed anywhere." This is false or, at best, only a half-truth. All economies, even very open ones, have both a traded sector that is exposed to foreign competition and a non-traded sector that is insulated from it. Manufacturing and agriculture tend to be in the traded sector. A growing number of services, from accounting to telephone operations, have been outsourced as well. But according to a recent study by the McKinsey Global Institute, only about 11 per cent of the world's service sector jobs can be performed remotely. Most services, such as home construction and hospital care, must by their very nature be provided by workers in the same location as their customers.

In advanced industrial economies, the number of workers in the traded sector exposed to foreign competition tends to diminish over time. When an industry in the traded sector outsources, unemployed workers tend to get new jobs in the non-traded domestic service sector. Workers in the non-traded service sector, such as nurses, may face competition from immigrants for jobs in the national labour market but they are not competing with foreign workers in a global labour market.

This brings us to the second misconception: "In order to compete in a global labour market, all students in advanced industrial countries need to be highly trained in science and mathematics." This, too, is false.

According to the US labour department, the 10 fastest-growing occupations in the US in 2002-2012 are the following: "medical assistants; networks systems and data communications analysts; physician assistants; social and human service assistants; home health aides; medical records and health information technicians; physical therapist aides; computer software engineers, applications; computer software engineers, systems software; physical therapist assistants." The future job outlook in other industrial democracies with service economies and ageing populations is similar.

It is true that four out of 10 of the fastest-growing occupations require proficiency with computers. But many of these jobs are vulnerable either to outsourcing or advances in automation. By contrast, the work of medical assistants, home health aides and physical therapists cannot be outsourced or performed by machines, barring radical advances in robotics. In the foreseeable future, nurses will outnumber computer technicians in the US and similar countries. It is absurd to tell the nurses of tomorrow that, in addition to being literate and numerate, they need to study trigonometry in order to compete with Indian and Chinese rivals.

If particular nations can benefit disproportionately from technological progress, then it may be wise for governments to promote education and employment in scientific and technical fields. But scientists and engineers will never be more than a minority of the workforce in any country, and it is highly misleading to suggest otherwise.

The third misconception about global competitiveness is this: "In order to compete in the global economy, the advanced industrial nations must downsize generous welfare states." The premise is that generous welfare states prevent high-wage countries from competing with low-wage countries such as China and India in traded-sector industries. But scaling back or abolishing the welfare state would do nothing to make the workers in a rich nation's traded sector better able to compete with labour costs in the developing world, unless workers were willing to work for Indian or Chinese wages.

Far from being handicapped by big government, the countries with the world's biggest welfare states are flourishing in the global economy. According to the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report, the most competitive economies in the world are, in order, Finland, the US, Sweden, Taiwan, Denmark and Norway. Government consumes around half of gross domestic product in all of these countries, apart from Taiwan and the US, where the combined federal-state share of GDP is slightly more than 30 per cent. (The US government share of GDP is much higher when tax deductions and exemptions for public purposes are counted.) What is more, on a per capita basis from 1990 to 2002, Sweden and Finland had the same 2 per cent growth rate as the US.

The truth is that the scale and scope of national welfare states is far less constrained by the global economy than many believe. Whether a country has a generous or stingy welfare state depends chiefly on its internal politics and traditions.

It is time, then, to replace the conventional wisdom. In the 21st century, most workers in advanced industrial nations will work in the non-traded domestic service sector. Most will not compete with workers in other countries. And a generous welfare state need not be a hindrance to competitiveness. These statements are not as familiar as the platitudes that make up the conventional wisdom. But they happen to be true.

The writer is Whitehead senior fellow at the New America Foundation

As a young nun in the 1960s I was not allowed to have any opinions. During our first week in the convent our mistress told us that many ideas and practices of the order would seem incomprehensible - even perverse at first - because we were spiritually immature and still tainted by secular values. As we progressed in the religious life we would find that these things gradually made sense. For now we should suspend our judgment.

I threw myself into this discipline because I was so eager to become wise and saintly. Before the reforms of the Second Vatican Council, nuns and priests were often trained systematically to distrust their own minds. Our views were of no value. A fellow novice was publicly lambasted for remarking that if Jesus had lived in our day he would have played the guitar. Our novice mistress believed he would have preferred Gregorian chant. I spent a week writing an essay proving the historicity of the resurrection. "But mother, it isn't true, is it?" I protested when it was handed back cum laude. "No, sister, it isn't true," our kindly teacher sighed, "but please - don't tell the others."

The trouble with this kind of training is that if you consistently deflect your mind from its bias towards truth you can damage it irrevocably. When potentially subversive ideas emerged I stamped on them so ruthlessly that after a while they ceased to come at all. After leaving the convent I studied at Oxford, only to find to my dismay that I was unable to think for myself. I marvelled at my fellow students, who could cry "I think!" with such confidence during an argument.

I have plenty of opinions now. But I have become increasingly wary of the assurance with which people express their views. We live in a highly opinionated society. The media bombards us with information, much of it superficial, and the internet makes available a plethora of facts, which are difficult to assess adequately. But we are encouraged to air our views, and are probably exposed to more opinions than at any time in history. Some sound plausible - unless you know a little about the subject.

This became clear to me after 9/11, when I spent a great deal of time discussing Islam and fundamentalism in Europe and the US. I found repeatedly that people took isolated remarks from articles, news reports and talk shows and from these fragments concocted absurd fantasies about "Islam" that bore no relation to the complex reality but to which they were resolutely committed. As they struggled with their fear and confusion they created dogmas that did not help them appraise the situation objectively.

People sometimes identify with their views so deeply that these become part of their sense of self and therefore sacred. My experience of studying and talking about religion has made me cautious of all orthodoxies. Liberal-minded atheists can be just as strident as fundamentalists if their idea of faith is challenged in any way, even if they know next to nothing about religious history or theology. Their opinions seem to have a psychological importance that renders accurate information irrelevant and obscurely threatening.

We need to strike a balance between the kind of repression that I experienced in my convent and the intellectual idolatry that makes ephemeral and ill-founded opinion absolute. People have a right to their views, but some ideas are more valuable than others. In a world where we are facing new dangers, we need clear heads that are not cluttered by dogmatic adherence to beliefs that are often indistinguishable from prejudice.

Opinions change with each generation, but we like to cast our views in stone. It gives us a sense of security in a changing and frightening world. Secular dogmas are no different from religious doctrines. The articles of the creeds were originally personal, subjective opinions about matters that were inexpressible, but because they were essential to the spiritual survival of an influential elite they became obligatory. The Qur'an calls compulsory theology zannah - self-indulgent guesswork about questions that are not verifiable, but which have split the faithful into warring sects.

The best way of countering the clashing dogmatisms of our time is to be suspicious of any idée fixe - including our own. Socrates made it his life's work to compel people to question their most fundamental assumptions. True knowledge was acquired only after an agonising struggle that involved your whole self.

The people who conversed with Socrates usually thought they knew what they were talking about, but by the end of the conversation he had exposed the flaws at the heart of each firmly held opinion. Some of our religious and political leaders could benefit from this dialectical process. Socrates' aim was to make his interlocutors admit that there were no easy answers. When you realised the depths of your confusion your philosophical quest could begin.

Ignorance is an essential part of the way humans experience the world: there is always something that eludes our understanding. We used to imagine science would answer all our questions, but modern physics and biology make clear that life is more mystifying than we ever imagined. Mystics have also pitted themselves against the dark world of uncreated reality and discovered a state of "unknowing" that could only be expressed by silence. The Chinese sages called any kind of orthodoxy one-sided "obsession" and insisted that unassailable conviction was a sign of immaturity.

To acknowledge our partiality and confusion is therefore more realistic than rigid adherence to a particular point of view. We have seen too much certainty - religious and secular - recently. We went to war because of a misplaced opinion that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. As we enter the uncharted political world of the 21st century, a humble recognition of the limits of our knowledge would seem to be the best policy.

· Karen Armstrong is the author of The Spiral Staircase, a Memoir

Last month, Baghdad's mayor threatened to resign over funding shortfalls, citing the city's unreliable water supply. Insurgents had damaged a water main, leaving 2 million residents without clean water. Like its water supply, Iraq's economy and infrastructure rehabilitation effort remains shaky. So, too, is the security situation and political transition.

Military conflict has two dimensions: winning wars and winning the peace. We excel in the first, but without an equal focus on the second, combat victories can be lost. Since 1993, the United States has undertaken six major nation-building operations. There were successes and failures, but one result was a contentious debate about U.S. involvement in such missions.

Sept. 11 transformed the debate. No longer are failing states and faraway conflicts viewed simply as a humanitarian concern. As President Bush said, "Weak states like Afghanistan can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states." Despite this recognition, the stark reality is that the United States does not have the right structural capability to stabilize and rebuild nations. Responsibility is diffuse and authority is uncertain. The proper roles of the military and civilian agencies have not been articulated. And civilian players desperately need a "unified command" structure to align policies, programs and resources.

The magnitude of the Iraq mission may be unique, but the need for prepared military and civilian personnel is not. Failing states and those emerging from conflict will remain part of the landscape, as will demand for U.S. involvement. So if we know the problem, what is the solution? The Council on Foreign Relations recently convened a task force to explore this question, leading to some suggestions:

· At the highest level, clear lines of authority must be drawn, especially to manage the often contradictory roles of the military and civilian agencies. The National Security Council is best suited for this task via a new directorate for post-conflict reconstruction.

· We must realize that no matter how experienced civilians may be, the military always will have the main responsibility for security in an immediate post-combat setting. Since Vietnam, the military has resisted an expanded stabilization and reconstruction role. The focus on high-intensity conflict means that the United States is winning wars faster and with fewer forces and casualties. But that "transformation" has had an unintended consequence. Rapid victory collapses the enemy but does not destroy it. Adversaries can go underground to regroup, creating a need for more troops for longer periods of time after combat ends. The United States needs a general-purpose force of sufficient size and skill to win the peace. This message must come unambiguously from the top. The secretary of defense should designate stabilization and reconstruction operations as core military tasks, with attendant changes in the training and preparation of U.S. forces. As a start, the temporary increase in troop levels should be made permanent.

· The civilian picture is in need of overhaul. Critical gaps in capability remain unfilled; elsewhere, mandates overlap. Until real authority is established, true accountability will remain elusive. As a first step, the State Department should be empowered to oversee all civilian stabilization and reconstruction activities, with the U.S. Agency for International Development responsible for daily operations. The new State Department coordinator for stabilization and reconstruction should be elevated to undersecretary status, backed up by a replenishing fund of $500 million that can be deployed quickly, easing reliance on supplemental appropriations for crises. A primary focus must be filling major gaps, including civilian police, judicial resources and demobilization and reintegration.

· To address the unacceptable time lags that hamper initial reconstruction efforts, the United States should push to create a $1 billion trust fund under the auspices of the Group of Eight to be initialized for top priority, year-one projects.

· Not every mission is or should be Iraq or Afghanistan. In many cases, U.N.-led operations are the most effective means of international community involvement. The $4 billion annual cost of all 17 U.N.-led deployments is a relative national security bargain. But multilateral peacekeeping is straining at the seams too. The Security Council continues to authorize peacekeeping missions at a rate that outpaces the United Nations' capacity. Member states are disinclined to contribute necessary troops and equipment, while failed states spiral into chaos and mass killings go unanswered.

Among other steps, the United Nations should focus more on interoperability of national forces that can be deployed in a multilateral setting. Further, new missions should not be authorized until the necessary resources are identified.

The United States needs an effective United Nations. Reform will require more attention and resources from key contributors such as America and its allies. By getting our own house in order, the United States will be in a stronger position to persuade others to change.

Former national security advisers Samuel R. Berger and Brent Scowcroft chair an independent Council on Foreign Relations task force on improving U.S. post-conflict capabilities.

Iraq's spiral of deadly sectarian violence has been between Arab Sunnis and Arab Shi'a. But if Iraq fragments, it will be along ethnic lines that pit Arabs against Kurds. The Kurds seek a secular republic with Kirkuk as the capitol of a federal Iraqi state called Kurdistan. If the constitution addresses their core demands, the Kurds might be flexible on other issues that threaten to break consensus during current negotiations on Iraq's permanent constitution.

Most Iraqis agree that the best way to balance the competing demands for democracy and unity is through a federal structure that assigns specific authorities to the national government while decentralizing control to regional and local governments.

As envisioned, powers would be reserved for federal Iraqi states unless they are specifically allocated to the national government. Federalism is a contract between equal groups; it is preferable to autonomy, which is bestowed by the national government to a lesser party and can be more easily revoked.

Although federal Iraqi states should be composed using geographic criteria, they should also take into account regional interests and cultural affinities. Saddam Hussein's policy of "ethnic correction" reapportioned territories within several northern provinces including Kirkuk. Consistent with Article 58 of the interim constitution, a system of property claims and compensation should be established so that displaced persons have the right to return to their homes before the Iraqi government conducts a census and organizes a popular referendum allowing them to determine their federal Iraqi state affiliations.

Other northerners — Arabs, Turkmen and Assyrians — are nervous about domination by Kurds in a federal Iraqi Kurdistan. Though federalism goes hand in hand with minority rights, the best way to guarantee their group rights is through a robust bill of individual rights enshrined in the Iraq Constitution. Given Iraq's history of ethno-religious conflict, the constitution should go even further by including explicit provisions protecting groups from discrimination, promoting equality and enabling them to preserve their unique identities.

The role of religion in Iraqi governance is another potential deal-breaker. The Kurds, who are staunchly secular and pro-Western, strongly resist efforts by clerics to apply Islamic law nationwide without restraint. Yet Islam is a powerful force shaping Iraqi society.

The circle can be squared by making Islam the official religion of Iraq and requiring that national legislation be consistent with Islamic law. The constitution should not, however, require the application of Islamic law to family matters such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. Consistent with the principle of decentralization, family law should be left to federal Iraqi states, which may enact any law they see fit, subject to the requirement that the law does not violate the rights of equal protection in the constitution. The Quran is subject to interpretation; conservative clerics must not push too hard.

If the constitution guarantees federalism and secularism, Kurdish leaders would be flexible on other contentious issues. For example, the Kurds may surrender exclusive control of the rich Kirkuk oil fields and allow the national government to control Iraq's national oil wealth, provided that revenues were distributed to federal Iraqi states based on their percentage of the total population.

Kurdish fighters — called peshmarga ("those who walk before death") — enjoy a revered position in Kurdish society for protecting Kurds from Saddam's genocidal campaigns and from the intrusion of Turkish troops. Though Kurdish leaders are likely to resist demobilizing and disarming the peshmarga, they might allow the whole units to be co-opted in the Iraqi national army, join federal Iraqi state civilian defense forces, perform local police functions or retire with a pension.

Compromise and consent will not be easy. If Iraqis fail to use negotiations of the permanent constitution as a tool of national reconciliation, violence could worsen and start to fragment. In this event, it would be in the United States national interest to withdraw its forces to Kurdistan, secure the Kirkuk oil fields, and protect the last bastion of democracy in Iraq. A moral dimension also exists: It would be wrong for the U.S. to sell out the Kurds as it did in 1974 and 1991.

David L. Phillips is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of "Losing Iraq."

Locked in a decade-old conflict over Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been increasing their military expenditures over the last few years. Lately this trend seems to have accelerated dramatically. The competition has launched an informal arms race in the South Caucasus that could easily lead to the further militarization of the entire region.

Previous estimates predicted that Azerbaijan's military expenditures in 2009 would reach $350 million -- seven times more than Georgia ($50 million) and almost three times more than Armenia ($120 million). However, Azerbaijan's defense budget is expected to reach $300 million this year, while Armenia's military expenditures are already well above $120 million. In fact, the military gap between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia in the coming years will be even more dramatic.

The unannounced arms race in the Caucasus started in 1994, when Armenia and Azerbaijan reached a cease-fire in their war over the Karabakh region. Despite the fact that both states have signed the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which set certain limitations on the number of troops and weapons stationed in Armenia and Azerbaijan, they have both occasionally violated the treaty's terms. Both states have purchased new military hardware and increased the size of their troop strength. In 1996-97 Russia supplied Armenia with over $1 billion in weaponry. In addition, Armenia transferred some of its military hardware to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, in order to bypass its quota under the CFE treaty.

In 2002, Armenia spent more on defense in GDP terms than the rest of the Commonwealth of Independent States member countries. According data by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, the Armenian government allocated $162 million, 6.4% of Armenia's GDP, for its military needs. In 2001, this number was around $135 million. Azerbaijan and Georgia spent 3.3% and 1.7% respectively.

Last year, the Armenian parliament proposed increasing Armenia's official military expenditures by another 12% ($106 million) in 2005, meaning a 13% share of the state budget. Subsequently, Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliev announced that Azerbaijan is planning to boost its defense spending by 25-30 percent in 2005. In 2004, Azerbaijan's military budget was estimated at around $150 million.

Several factors have intensified the arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan in recent months. The opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which Azerbaijan views as a major source of future income, has seriously threatened the position of official Yerevan.

For Azerbaijan, more oil exports mean more revenues and that, in turn, means more spending on the military. President Aliev has repeatedly stated that Azerbaijan will use its economic potential to solve "all its problems," including the Karabakh conflict. Starting from last year, Azerbaijani defense officials have begun attending military exhibitions in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar with plans to purchase foreign military hardware in the future.

Another issue is the recent transfer of Russian military hardware from Russian bases in Georgia to Armenia. Armenian Defense Minister Serge Sarkisian has spoken out in favor of redeployment and said that Armenia is "in favor of strengthening the Russian military bases in Armenia and increasing their weapon reserves."

On June 25, speaking at the graduation ceremony for Azerbaijan's military school, Aliev announced a 70% increase in military spending -- expanding the budget to $300 million this year, up from $175 million in 2004. Aliev particularly mentioned concerns over the planned relocation of Russian military hardware from Georgia to Armenia.

With the promise of oil money and with half of its population still young, Azerbaijan's chances of becoming a strong military power in the South Caucasus seem great. Within several years, Azerbaijan's military budget could be equal to the entire budget of Armenia, and official Yerevan realizes this danger.

In May, referring to Azerbaijan's growing budget and increasing military expenditures, Armenian Prime Minister Andranik Margarian stated, "[Armenia] will draw the appropriate conclusions and will increase expenditures for defense accordingly." However, he also added that an increase in the Armenian military budget would be implemented as far as Armenia's financial capabilities and possibilities allow it.

It is not clear how long the arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan could last. Yet, there is no doubt that, with the unresolved Karabakh conflict and the increasing presence of Russian troops in Armenia, the arms race will intensify even more.

THERE ARE NOT many places in Iraq where the locals want to celebrate American Independence Day. But, in Iraq's self-governing Kurdistan region, the newly elected government decided to host a Fourth of July party for their American allies. Top coalition officers were invited along with US civilians, food and drinks ordered (the secular Kurds serve and drink alcohol), and the Kurdistan prime minister had prepared his speech. Then America's top diplomat in the region delivered an ultimatum: She would not attend unless the Kurds flew Iraq's flag at the party. The Kurds refused and canceled the party.

The current Iraqi flag was chosen by Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party to signify the unity of Arab lands. For the non-Arab Kurds the flag is not only a symbol of their second class status but they also associate it with the atrocities-- including use of poison gas-- of the former regime. Many of Iraq's Arab leaders have been sensitive to Kurdish concerns. When they visit the region, they do not make a fuss over the flag.

For Iraq's Kurds, the flag episode epitomizes America's ingratitude for their role as an ally in the war to overthrow Saddam Hussein and as the strongest supporter of US postwar policies. They note that American diplomats have no qualms about calling on Shi'ite politicians who display portraits of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini and that the United States has pushed for the inclusion of Sunni Arabs, many former Ba'athists, in the constitution drafting committee. Iraq's Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafaari was warmly received at the White House even though his party, Dawa, was on the State Department terrorist list until a few years ago for the 1982 suicide bombing of the US embassy in Kuwait.

US indifference to Kurdish sensibilities could have far reaching consequences. The Kurds are engaged in a struggle with the Shi'ite majority of Iraq's constitution drafting committee over the principles that will guide the new Iraq.

The majority draft would make Iraq a ''federal Islamic republic." Rights of women would be sharply restricted as Islamic law replaces Iraq's relatively progressive civil code on matters of inheritance, divorce, and child custody. The document is anti-Jewish, denying Iraqi Jews rights granted other Iraqis. The Shi'ite majority is even proposing to incorporate the ''marjah" -- Iraq's leading Shi'ite cleric -- into the constitution, a step that could give the Ayatollah Sistani powers similar to those Khomeini exercised in the first decade of Iran's Islamic Republic.

The Kurds oppose all these measures. They are secular and insist that any reference to the Islamic character of Iraq be balanced by a declaration that no law can violate fundamental human rights. They are proud of the progress that women have made in the 14 years of Kurdish self-rule in the north of Iraq and do not want it rolled back. They share none of the antipathy Arab Iraqis feel toward the Jews.

With a population almost unanimously in favor of independence, Kurdistan leaders insist that Iraq have a federal structure that will allow them to retain their secular, Western-oriented political system even if the rest of Iraq falls under the sway of the religious parties. They are alarmed by growing Iranian influence in Baghdad and in the Shi'ite south, and see a strong, self-governing Kurdistan as a barrier to enlarging Iran's influence.

No constitution can be approved unless the Kurds go along, and the Kurds want to be in the position to walk away from a constitution that is illiberal and too centralized. But, instead of support from the Bush administration, they feel intense pressure to make compromises so as to meet the Aug. 15 deadline.

While the Bush administration professes a hands-off policy toward constitutional deliberations, it has been lobbying hard against a provision that would give Iraq's regions control over natural resources. Having been dependent on payments from Baghdad in the past, the Kurds know that meaningful self-government requires control over their own petroleum. The Bush administration apparently believes a Shi'ite region in the south would be less favorable toward US oil companies than the Shi'ite-run Oil Ministry in Baghdad, but in reality there is unlikely to be a difference. To the dismay of the Kurds, there has been no similar American engagement with regard to the anti-Jewish or antiwoman provisions of the proposed constitution.

The United States should take a genuine hands-off approach toward the new constitution. The content is far more important than meeting the deadline for its completion, and the Bush administration should not punish America's best friends in Iraq if they walk away from a document that blatantly contradicts the democratic values President Bush now says are the reason for our continued presence in the country.

Peter W. Galbraith, a former US ambassador to Croatia, is senior diplomatic fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

As we have seen this week in the historic agreement between the U.S. and India on civil nuclear cooperation, diplomacy is flourishing once more at the State Department.

Condoleezza Rice is driving this return to diplomacy, and the deal with New Delhi reflects the extraordinary U.S. diplomatic activism that has characterized her brief time in office: a commitment to ease the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, where she has just spent two days; intense efforts to promote a successful Israeli withdrawal from Gaza; a systematic strategy to increase international support for Iraq; a renewed diplomatic presence in Asia through a series of bilateral visits to the region by the secretary and her senior colleagues; a resumption of the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program; full support for the EU-3 attempt to persuade Iran to cease its acquisition of nuclear weapons; improvement in the Transatlantic relationship; and so forth.

Diplomacy is the effort to influence the policies of other governments through negotiation, whether unilaterally or with coalitions. This can be by persuasion, threat, or coercion short of force. Such effective American diplomacy requires at least five elements.

• First, there must be a trusting relationship between the president and the secretary of state, an instinctive agreement regarding the objectives and methods of U.S. foreign policy. They must have the same strategic DNA. This was true during each of the post-1945 surges of historic statecraft: Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Ronald Reagan and George Shultz, George H.W. Bush and James Baker. The president must never wonder if the secretary of state has a separate agenda, or is half-hearted in carrying out the administration's goals while winking and nodding at foreign counterparts -- or those in Congress -- who disagree with U.S. policy. Acheson wrote that, "The most important aspect of the relationship between the president and the secretary of state is that they both understand who is president."
 

The secretary must also decisively demonstrate that the State Department is an instrument to accomplish the president's goals, and not a continual obstacle to them. This requires that the secretary force the president's agenda on the department, not the other way around. And other governments must be confident that the secretary always speaks for the president and can deliver on commitments. Ms. Rice more than satisfies all these requirements.

• Second, the celebrated secretaries of state knew what they wanted to accomplish (under presidential guidance) over the longer term, and how they intended to do it. Mr. Baker stressed, "Never let the other fellow set the agenda." And Mr. Shultz said this of Reagan, "He had a strong and constructive agenda, much of it labeled impossible and unattainable in the early years of his presidency. He challenged the conventional wisdom. . . " Or Mr. Kissinger: "Leaders must invoke an alchemy of great vision."
 

As Washington debates this president's "great vision" toward the Greater Middle East, it is useful to remember that all four of the presidents and secretaries of state I mention above -- the giants, with Cordell Hull, of U.S. diplomacy in the 20th century -- departed from commonplace foreign policy ideas. These statesmen set out to alter the world in fundamental, and beneficial, ways. And they succeeded.

Nietzsche thought that "Man's most enduring stupidity is forgetting what he is trying to do." The consummate secretaries of state remember every morning what they are trying to achieve over an extended timeline. Mr. Kissinger points out that secretaries must come to the post with those strategic ideas already fully developed, because the office "consumes intellectual capital; it does not create it."

A quick perusal of Ms. Rice's recent public statements shows that she knows very well what she is trying to accomplish on behalf of the American people and the president, and that her mission is not primarily measured in days, weeks or months. In public pronouncements, she persistently returns to historic themes, as she did in her recent speech at Cairo University, because she seeks to shape the world as deeply as did her most illustrious forerunners.

• Third, the secretary must be a skilful diplomat. This does not mean always being the essence of congeniality, and it cannot be manifested mostly inside the Beltway or by telephone. Recall that Mr. Baker, in his first few weeks in office, went to every NATO capital to see their politicians on their home turf. Mr. Kissinger was on the road so much that there was a magazine cover with the flash, "Kissinger Visits America." They wanted to smell the domestic politics that their counterparts had to deal with and they knew that Ma Bell was not the answer.

Messrs. Kissinger and Baker understood that diplomacy depends on establishing close personal relationships as well as on power, and that attending periodic large international meetings was not the same as visiting their foreign colleagues in their capitals. Mr. Shultz has observed that "listening is an underrated way to acquire knowledge." The best place to do such listening (and convincing) is in their setting, not ours. With a personality that can range from cashmere to kryptonite, Ms. Rice has been constantly abroad since she has been in office, and has already visited dozens of countries. This is a calculated strategy, and it exhibits her command of this tool of diplomacy. (And she never has to worry that frequent foreign travel will weaken her influence with the president.)

• Fourth, a successful secretary of state must put together an all-star team. This Ms. Rice has done, recruiting the best talent at State in decades. Bob Zoellick has long been recognized as a premier public policy intellectual and practitioner. He may be the most talented number two at State since Acheson. Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nick Burns is the most gifted Foreign Service Officer of his generation. Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security Bob Joseph is a non-proliferation master. Undersecretary Designate for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes is magisterial in her command of public persuasion. Undersecretary designate for Economic Affairs Josette Shiner is a canny Washington insider. Counselor Philip Zelikow is smarter than almost anybody. And her assistant secretaries are brainy and battle-tested.

 
• Fifth, the secretary must be an eloquent public voice of U.S. foreign policy. During her short time in office, Ms. Rice has delivered many speeches, had dozens of press conferences, and given innumerable media interviews. She believes that explaining the administration's foreign policy is a crucial dimension of her job -- and clearly has more than a knack for it.
 

All this is not necessarily to say that Ms. Rice will one day be seen as a great secretary of state. Challenges abound: Iraq remains tough; the EU-3 negotiations with Tehran are likely to collapse this year; North Korea may spark an upheaval in Northeast Asia; the Middle East peace process will probably be in serious trouble after Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, if not before; U.S.-Russia relations deteriorate; Chinese power is ever more prominent in Asia; Latin America throbs with leftist uncertainty. And, as Mr. Kissinger has said, "Each success only buys an admission ticket to a more difficult problem."

The foremost secretaries of state encountered such a catalogue of challenges, but perhaps only James Baker, with German unification and the end of the Soviet Union, had as many opportunities as does this secretary. Freedom is marching forward, including in the Greater Middle East. Authoritarianism is on the defensive. Building on American primacy, there is reason and evidence for strategic and moral optimism. Ms. Rice has all the requisites to make her tenure at the State Department as consequential as those of her most eminent predecessors in the past century. History awaits her performance.

Mr. Blackwill is president of Barbour Griffith & Rogers International, a Republican lobbying and consulting firm. He was U.S. ambassador to India from 2001-2003, and deputy national security adviser for strategic planning in 2003-2004.'

The first signs that America's top officials in Iraq were revising their thinking about what they might accomplish in Iraq came a year ago. As Iraq resumed its sovereignty after the period of American occupation, the new American team that arrived then, headed by Ambassador John D. Negroponte, had a withering term for the optimistic approach of their predecessors, led by L. Paul Bremer III.

The new team called the departing Americans "the illusionists," for their conviction that America could create a Jeffersonian democracy on the ruins of Saddam Hussein's medieval brutalism. One American military commander began his first encounter with American reporters by asking, "Well, gentlemen, tell me: Do you think that events here afford us the luxury of hope?"

It seemed clear then that the administration, for all its public optimism, had begun substituting more modest goals for the idealists' conception of Iraq. How much more modest has become clearer in the 12 months since.

From the moment American troops crossed the border 28 months ago, the specter hanging over the American enterprise here has been that Iraq, freed from Mr. Hussein's tyranny, might prove to be so fractured - by politics and religion, by culture and geography, and by the suspicion and enmity sown by Mr. Hussein's years of repression - that it would spiral inexorably into civil war.

If it did, opponents of the American-led invasion had warned, American troops could get caught in the crossfire between Sunnis and Shiites, Kurds and Turkmen, secularists and believers - reduced, in the grimmest circumstances, to the common target of a host of contending militias.

Now, events are pointing more than ever to the possibility that the nightmare could come true. Recent weeks have seen the insurgency reach new heights of sustained brutality. The violence is ever more centered on sectarian killings, with Sunni insurgents targeting hundreds of Shiite and Kurdish civilians in suicide bombings. There are reports of Shiite death squads, some with links to the interior ministry, retaliating by abducting and killing Sunni clerics and community leaders.

The past 10 days have seen such a quickening of these killings, particularly by the insurgents, that many Iraqis are saying that the civil war has already begun.

That at least some senior officials in Washington understand the gravity of the situation seems clear from remarks made at the Foreign Press Center in Washington two weeks ago by Zalmay Khalilzad, who arrives in Baghdad this week to begin as Mr. Negroponte's successor. In his remarks, Mr. Khalilzad abandoned a convention that had bound senior American officials when speaking of Iraq - to talk of civil war only if reporters raised it first, and then only to dismiss it as a beyond-the-fringe possibility. Using the term twice in one paragraph, he spoke of civil war as something America must do everything to avoid.

"Iraq is poised at the crossroads between two starkly different visions," he said. "The foreign terrorists and hardline Baathist insurgents want Iraq to fall into a civil war."

The new ambassador struck a positive chord, to be sure, saying "Iraqis of all communities and sects, like people everywhere, want to establish peace and create prosperity." Still, his coda remained one of caution: "I do not underestimate the difficulty of the present situation."

One measure of the doubts afflicting American officials here has been a hedging in the upbeat military assessments that generals usually offer, coupled with a resort to statistics carefully groomed to show progress in curbing the insurgents that seems divorced from realities on the ground. One example of the new "metrics" has been a rush of figures on the buildup of Iraq's army and police force - a program known to many reporters who have been embedded on joint operations as one beset by inadequate training, poor leadership, inadequate weaponry and poor morale.

Officers involved in running the program offer impressive-sounding figures - including the fact that, by mid-June, the Iraqi forces had been given 306 million rounds of ammunition, roughly 12 bullets for each of Iraq's 25 million people. But when one senior American officer involved was asked whether the Americans might end up arming the Iraqis for a civil war, he paused for a moment, then nodded. "Maybe," he said.

The war's wider pattern has always held the seeds of an all-out sectarian conflict, of the kind that largely destroyed Lebanon. The insurgency has been rooted in the Sunni Arab minority dispossessed by the toppling of Mr. Hussein, and most of its victims have been Shiites, the majority community who have been the main political beneficiaries of Mr. Hussein's demise. Shiites have died in countless hundreds at their mosques and their marketplaces, victims of insurgent ambushes and bombs, their deaths celebrated on Islamic Web sites by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Al Qaeda's leader in Iraq, who has called Shiites "monkeys" and their religion an affront to God.

Last weekend, it was the turn of the small town of Mussayib, where at least 71 people died when a suicide bomber blew himself up under a fuel tanker outside the main mosque. Hitherto, Iraq's leading Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, had urged Shiites not to retaliate, but to focus instead on the American-sponsored electoral process, which brought Shiite parties victory in January and is likely to do so again in voting for a full, five-year government in December.

But this time, the ayatollah, his patience spent, demanded that the transitional government, which is led by Shiites, "defend the country against mass annihilation."

If that was a call for tougher military action against the insurgents, it played into a situation made all the more volatile in recent months by signs that hard-line Shiites have begun to strike back. There have been persistent reports, mostly in Baghdad, of Shiite death squads in police uniforms abducting, torturing and killing Sunni Arab clerics, community leaders and others. In Baghdad, a police commando unit composed mainly of Shiites raided a hospital two weekends ago and abducted 13 Sunni men accused of being insurgents. Sixteen hours later, the bodies of 10 were delivered to a morgue, the victims of suffocation in a locked metal-topped police van in a temperature nearing 120 degrees.

Even the new Iraqi forces, hailed by the Bush administration as the key to an eventual American troop withdrawal, seem as likely to provoke a civil war as to prevent one. The 170,000 men already trained are dominated by Shiites and Kurds, in a proportion even higher than the 80 percent those groups represent in the population. Though there are thousands of Sunni Arabs in the forces, including some generals, Iraqi units that are sent to the worst hot spots are often dominated by Shiites and Kurds, some recruited from sectarian militias deeply hostile to Sunni Arabs.

The contempt this provokes was voiced by Dhari al-Bedri, a Baghdad University professor with a home in Samarra, a Sunni town. "The Iraqi army in Samarra is Badr, Dawa and Pesh Merga," he said, citing the militias of the two largest Shiite political parties, and of the Kurds. "The people feel that the army does not come to serve them, but to punish them. The people hate them."

The American hope is that the political process under way will succeed, eventually, in forging a broad enough consensus that hard-liners on all sides will be isolated. The odds on that, though slim, seemed to rise a bit with an agreement this month that added 15 Sunni Arabs to the 55-member parliamentary committee charged with drawing up the constitution. But when two of the Sunni men involved in that process were gunned down in Baghdad last week, some other Sunni members pointed to Shiites as the killers, and said the killings showed that Shiite hard-liners wanted no compromise.

Despite these gloomy trends, American commanders have continued to hint at the possibility of at least an initial reduction of the 140,000 American troops stationed here by next summer, contingent on progress in creating effective Iraqi units. Some senior officers have said privately that there is a chance that the pullback will be ordered regardless of what is happening in the war, and that the rationale will be that Iraq - its politicians and its warriors - will ultimately have to find ways of overcoming their divides on their own.

America, these officers seem to be saying, can do only so much, and if Iraqis are hellbent on settling matters violently - at the worst, by civil war - that, in the end, would be their sovereign choice.

Kurdish leaders have requested that the new Iraqi constitution guarantee the Kurdish minority the right to vote on independence in eight years, a Kurdish member of the constitutional committee said Friday.

The call for a referendum on secession from Iraq is the Kurds' most overt push toward independence since the fall of president Saddam Hussein.

Saadi Barzanchani, a Kurdish member of the national committee drafting the constitution, said Kurds would probably vote to remain part of Iraq if the country became the democracy that Iraqi and U.S. leaders have promised. "Eight years will be sufficient time to see," he said in an interview.

Barzanchani said Kurdistan's regional parliament made the decision to push for a guaranteed right to vote in the new constitution, which the committee is trying to piece together by Aug. 15.

Many Sunni Arabs, a minority group that had ruled the country for eight decades, oppose Kurdish independence and a drive for autonomy by some Shiite Arabs in the southern part of the country. Shiites make up the majority of Iraq's population.

"Iraq is a united country. I call on patriots to stand against this brutal campaign and insist that Iraq should be one country, one land and one rule," Mahmoud Sumaidaie, a Sunni cleric, said in a sermon during Friday prayers at a mosque in Baghdad. "We don't want the separation. Iraq will be the homeland of the Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds and other minorities."

Countries that border Iraq have long opposed statehood for the estimated 3.5 million Iraqi Kurds, who represent a fraction of the approximately 20 million Kurds living in a region that stretches from Turkey through the former Soviet Union to Iran. Iraq's neighbors fear that allowing independence for Iraqi Kurds would fuel separatist drives in their own countries.

U.S. officials have consistently opposed the secession hopes of their Iraqi Kurdish allies, saying a landlocked Kurdistan, surrounded by hostile neighbors, would not be viable.

Barzanchani said secession was "the legitimate right of each part of Iraq." He argued that granting all regions the right to break away if the central government neglected them was "one of the strongest guarantees of unity" for Iraq.

Kurds make up 15 to 20 percent of Iraq's population. In the 1980s, Hussein unleashed a campaign of violence against the Kurds that killed more than 100,000 in northern Iraq, according to international human rights groups. Hussein also crushed a Kurdish revolt following the Persian Gulf War. U.S. forces later enforced a no-fly zone that gave Kurds enough protection to declare autonomy.

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, has said he wants the Kurdish region to remain part of Iraq. But separatist sentiment pervades his homeland.

More than 90 percent of voters questioned in Kurdistan during January's national elections said they wanted independence, according to a frequently cited survey conducted at polling places.

The debate over how much autonomy to give Kurds in the north, Shiites in the south, and Sunnis in the center and west of the country has become one of the most difficult issues to be settled before Iraq can draft a constitution.

Kurdish leaders have been audacious in pushing their claims. This week, they unveiled a map -- which they wanted appended to the new constitution -- that lays claim to hundreds of miles of territory extending south of Baghdad. The territory includes the disputed, oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

Another Kurdish official, Mullah Bakhtiyar, later told the Associated Press that the extended boundary was a "red line" for Kurds and that they were committed to it.

A Western diplomat on Friday urged members of the constitutional committee to maintain "flexibility and realism."

The diplomat, speaking to reporters in Baghdad under the agreement that he not be named, also appealed to the constitution's framers to stick to the Aug. 15 deadline for having a draft constitution approved by the National Assembly. The charter would then go before Iraqi voters.

"You kick this down the road six months, it's going to look like the whole process is blocked," the diplomat said.

The diplomat also said a draft he saw Friday had removed a stipulation that family matters such as divorce and inheritance be governed by the laws of an individual's religious sect. Some Iraqis had feared that religious law under the rule could be used to limit the rights of women. The official stressed, however, that the wording of the constitution was changing daily.

... '

Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu of the Chinese People's Liberation Army caused quite a stir last week when he threatened to nuke "hundreds" of American cities if the U.S. dared to interfere with a Chinese attempt to conquer Taiwan.

This saber-rattling comes while China is building a lot of sabers. Although its defense budget, estimated to be as much as $90 billion, remains a fraction of the United States', it is enough to make China the world's third-biggest weapons buyer (behind Russia) and the biggest in Asia. Moreover, China's spending has been increasing rapidly, and it is investing in the kind of systems — especially missiles and submarines — needed to challenge U.S. naval power in the Pacific.

The Pentagon on Tuesday released a study of Chinese military capabilities. In a preview, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told a Singapore audience last month that China's arms buildup was an "area of concern." It should be. But we shouldn't get overly fixated on such traditional indices of military power as ships and bombs — not even atomic bombs. Chinese strategists, in the best tradition of Sun Tzu, are working on craftier schemes to topple the American hegemon.

In 1998, an official People's Liberation Army publishing house brought out a treatise called "Unrestricted Warfare," written by two senior army colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. This book, which is available in English translation, is well known to the U.S. national security establishment but remains practically unheard of among the general public.

"Unrestricted Warfare" recognizes that it is practically impossible to challenge the U.S. on its own terms. No one else can afford to build mega-expensive weapons systems like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which will cost more than $200 billion to develop. "The way to extricate oneself from this predicament," the authors write, "is to develop a different approach."

Their different approaches include financial warfare (subverting banking systems and stock markets), drug warfare (attacking the fabric of society by flooding it with illicit drugs), psychological and media warfare (manipulating perceptions to break down enemy will), international law warfare (blocking enemy actions using multinational organizations), resource warfare (seizing control of vital natural resources), even ecological warfare (creating man-made earthquakes or other natural disasters).

Cols. Qiao and Wang write approvingly of Al Qaeda, Colombian drug lords and computer hackers who operate outside the "bandwidths understood by the American military." They envision a scenario in which a "network attack against the enemy" — clearly a red, white and blue enemy — would be carried out "so that the civilian electricity network, traffic dispatching network, financial transaction network, telephone communications network and mass media network are completely paralyzed," leading to "social panic, street riots and a political crisis." Only then would conventional military force be deployed "until the enemy is forced to sign a dishonorable peace treaty."

This isn't just loose talk. There are signs of this strategy being implemented. The anti-Japanese riots that swept China in April? That would be psychological warfare against a major Asian rival. The stage-managed protests in 1999, after the U.S. accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, fall into the same category.

The bid by the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Co., to acquire Unocal? Resource warfare. Attempts by China's spy apparatus to infiltrate U.S. high-tech firms and defense contractors? Technological warfare. China siding against the U.S. in the U.N. Security Council over the invasion of Iraq? International law warfare. Gen. Zhu's threat to nuke the U.S.? Media warfare.

And so on. Once you know what to look for, the pieces fall into place with disturbing ease. Of course, most of these events have alternative, more benign explanations: Maybe Gen. Zhu is an eccentric old coot who's seen "Dr. Strangelove" a few too many times.

The deliberate ambiguity makes it hard to craft a response to "unrestricted warfare." If Beijing sticks to building nuclear weapons, we know how to deal with that — use the deterrence doctrine that worked against the Soviets. But how do we respond to what may or may not be indirect aggression by a major trading partner? Battling terrorist groups like Al Qaeda seems like a cinch by comparison.

This is not a challenge the Pentagon is set up to address, but it's an urgent issue for the years ahead.

... Four steps are now urgently needed. First, the Bush administration must declare that the United States will not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. Its refusal to do so has aroused Iraqi suspicions that we seek long-term domination of their country. Second, we should declare some sort of time frame (but not a rigid deadline) by which we think we can withdraw militarily—if Iraqi groups that are supporting or tolerating the violence will instead help build the new political order. Third, we need to talk directly to the (largely Sunni) political groups connected to the insurgency, some of which have been seeking to talk to the United States for more than a year now. Fourth, we need an honest broker to help mediate these discussions and build confidence in the process. This role could be played by a small international contact group consisting of a high-level representative of the United Nations and perhaps one or two of the European ambassadors now resident in Baghdad.

... Failure in Iraq would be characterized by any of the following disaster scenarios:

1.      Iraqis' rejection of their democracy.

2.      Democratic institutions scrapped by a strongman ("Saddam lite") or an Islamist radical.

3.      Leaders drastically thrown off their political schedule.

4.      Security training thwarted by intimidation of recruits.

5.     A nation inflamed in civil war.

None of these have occurred. ...

11 Eylül'den sonraki gelişmeler İslam dünyasında Amerika'ya karşı büyük bir husumetin doğmasına yol açtı. Müslüman kitleler El Kaide terörünün ardında Amerika'yı aramak gibi bir paranoya içine girdiler. Amerika'nın İslam dünyasını yıkmak amacını taşıdığına inanmaya başladılar. Bu durum sürdükçe ne terörizm engellenebilir ne de İslam dünyası demokratikleşebilir.
Türkiye için sorunun başka vahim yönleri de var.
1 Mart tezkere olayından sonra Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri hâlâ düzeltilemeyen bir bozulma sürecine girdi. Amerika, özellikle Kuzey Irak'ta Türkmen hakları, Kerkük ve PKK konularında Türkiye'yi cezalandırma yoluna gitti. Türkiye'nin uyarılarına ve verdiği sözlere rağmen, Kuzey Irak'ta Kandil Dağı'nda üslenen PKK'nın varlığına göz yumdu. Kendisinin de terörist saydığı örgütün silahsızlandırılmasına dahi çalışmadı.
Bugün yarısı Türkiye'ye geçen PKK terör eylemlerine yine başladı. Demiryollarını mayınlıyor, ülkenin batısında bombalar patlatarak turizmi baltalıyor. Sol ve etnik milliyetçilik karışımı faşist ve nihilist (yani kendisine ve başkasına zarar vermekten başka gerçek hedefi olmayan) bir grup Kürt siyasetçisi, Öcalan'ın emriyle federalizmi savunuyor. Kuzey Irak'ta kurulacak Kürt federe devletiyle ileride birleşip bağımsız devlet kurmayı amaçlıyor. Türkiye'nin AB aşkı dolayısıyla OHAL ilan edemeyeceğini ve bu taleplere baş eğeceğini umuyor. Amerika'nın PKK'yı koruyacağından emin, Kuzey Irak'ta Türkiye'yi Amerika ile karşı karşıya getirme hesabını yapıyor.
PKK'nın Kandil'deki varlığını korumak ile küresel düzlemde terörizmle mücadele arasındaki inanılmaz çelişkiyi bir yana bırakalım. PKK'nın Türkiye'de öldürdüğü her kişi Türk halkı tarafından Amerika'nın sorumluluğu olarak görülüyor ve ilişkilerimiz onarılması güç biçimde tahrip oluyor.
PKK AB'deki faaliyetlerini de sürdürüyor. Yüzlerce dernek, onlarca basın ve yayın organı, Avrupalı sempatizanlarıyla birlikte Türkiye'deki PKK terörünü kışkırtıyor, finans sağlıyor, siyasi destek veriyor. Bir Kürt siyasetçisi, PKK'nın terör eylemlerinin, üyeliğimize karşı bazı AB devletlerinin desteği olmadan yapılamayacağını açıkça söylüyor.
Londra ve Madrid eylemlerine binlerce kez terörizm diyen Batı basını, bırakın PKK'ya terörist örgüt demeyi, Çeşme'de patlayıcı şişenin çöp sepetine konulması ve Kuşadası'nda minibüsün bombalanmasına 'terör eylemi' dahi diyemiyor. Onlara göre PKK'nın ismi Kürt İşçi Partisi, teröristler 'militan', terör eylemleriyse 'askeri kanadın' 'saldırısı'ndan ibaret.
Batı'nın terörizmi sınıflandırdığı anlaşılıyor. Etnik milliyetçi kaynaklı şiddet eylemleri, sivillere yönelse bile terörizm sayılmıyor. Reform denen süreçle teröristlerin taleplerinin yerine getirilmesi isteniyor. Terörizme meşru bir işlev veriliyor.
Batı karşıtı terörizm ise akıl dışı, hatta hastalıklı görülüyor. Batı'nın yüksek uygarlık değerlerini yok etmeye dönük bu 'İslami' terörizmin yok edilmesi de meşru oluyor. Bu terörizmle mücadelede Müslümanların da işbirliği yapması isteniyor.
Oysa Batı'nın PKK'ya ilişkin mantığının El Kaide'ye de pekâlâ uygulanabileceği unutuluyor.
El Kaide, Amerika'nın Ortadoğu'ya ve İslam ülkelerine ilişkin dış politikasının değiştirilmesini yani Filistin'e hakça davranılmasını ve Irak işgalinin sona erdirilmesini istiyor. Meşru sayılabilecek bu istekler 'Cihatçı' terörizmi meşru kılar mı?
Aslında Myers başta Amerikalı ilgililer, egemen Irak hükümetinin muhatabımız olduğunu söylemekle, sorunun kendilerini doğrudan ilgilendirmediğini, Irak'tan kaynaklanan terörizme karşı müdahale hakkımızın bulunduğunu dolaylı biçimde kabul ediyorlar.
Hukuken PKK terörizminde Irak taraf değil (uninvolved). Buna karşı önlem almak istemezse (unwilling) veya alamazsa (unable), Türkiye gereğini yapma hakkına sahip. Bunu Amerika'nın resmi terör uzmanları 13 Mayıs günü tam da yerinde ifade ettiler.
ABD terörizmle mücadelede Türkiye'nin işbirliğini istiyorsa, PKK'yı etkisizleştirmeli veya bizim müdahalemizi anlayışla karşılamalı.

Terörde "tahammül sınırı"nın aşıldığı noktada Türkiye'nin gerekeni yapacağını da kaydeden Erdoğan sözlerine şöyle devam etti:
"Burada zaten ülkelere, devletlere verilmiş olan yetkiler vardır. Bu, uluslararası hukukun da gereğidir. Bu, Türkiye'nin o meşru hakkını kullanma anıdır. Ve bunun da gereği neyse, kuralları neyse bu kurallar içersinde bu harekâtı Türkiye yapar. Ha bunu Irak'ın ilgilileriyle, sorumlularıyla şüphesiz ki görüşerek yapar. Ama öyle anlar gelir ki, görüşmeden yapar. Niye? Çünkü bu uluslararası verilmiş bir yetkidir."'

On the question of whether China's Cnooc oil company should be permitted by the U.S. government to purchase the U.S. oil and gas company Unocal, my view is very simple: let the market rule. Oil is fungible. It is all one global market. And if China wants to overpay for a second-tier U.S. energy company, that's China's business. Anyway, the more starved Americans are for oil, the sooner we will adopt alternatives and get off this drug once and for all.

If I seem uninterested in this matter, I am. Because I do not think the important issue is who owns Unocal. The important issue is whether America and China are drifting into a dangerous confrontation over geoeconomics. How so? Well, in brief, the Chinese and U.S. economies have become totally intertwined. While we have been focused on 9/11 and Iraq, China and America have become, in economic terms, Siamese twins.

You know that cheap mortgage you just got? Well, who do you think subsidized it? In many ways it was China. Americans don't save anymore, and import more than they export. Normally, a nation that did that as long and lavishly as the U.S. has would have to raise interest rates to get other countries to hold its currency. But America has not had to do that, in part because China has been willing to hold most of the dollars it has been accumulating - gained from all the goods it is selling America - despite the low interest paid on those dollars and the fact that they have been depreciating against other major currencies.

How come? Call it the Tiananmen-Texas Bargain. After Tiananmen, China's leaders struck an implicit bargain with their people, argued Steven Weber, director of Berkeley's Institute of International Studies. "The bargain is that China's voters give up the right to vote, and the Chinese government guarantees China's middle class 9 percent annual economic growth. China's political stability today depends on that bargain."

The Texas side of that bargain came from the Bush team. For a long time, it ignored China's undervalued currency so China could sell us lots of cheap stuff and would continue holding our devaluing dollars and helping to keep U.S. interest rates low. Our buying binge helped keep China's workers employed and its leaders in power. Their holding our depreciating dollars helped you buy a house with no money down. We've been in symbiotic relationships like this before with Western Europe and Japan during the cold war, but they were allies and democracies, so we could adjust imbalances more easily. Not so with China.

We are Siamese twins, but most unlikely ones - joined at the hip, but not identical. That's a problem. Because we now need to adjust the Tiananmen-Texas bargain. So many U.S. dollars and jobs are flowing to China, it is becoming politically and economically unsustainable for the Bush team. Hedge funds have made huge speculative bets around the T-T bargain. We need China to revalue its currency upward against the dollar, so China buys more stuff from us and we buy less stuff from China.

But China's foreign exchange reserves today are nearly $750 billion and heading for $1 trillion - most in U.S. Treasury notes. If China is compelled by the U.S. to revalue its currency, and effectively devalue the dollar further, Beijing will take a big hit on all of its dollar reserves - especially since most experts say the dollar has to be devalued by 30 to 40 percent against the Chinese currency to have any impact on the trade balance. That would also be likely to affect the dollar's value against other currencies and create pressure for inflation and higher interest rates in the U.S.

"If the dollar falls and U.S. interest rates rise, it could cause a recession or stagflation in America," Professor Weber said. "But if the Chinese currency rises too far too fast and triggers unemployment, it could cause a revolution against the Communist Party. ... We might see our dollar policy as a market adjustment, but they could see it as an attempt at regime change."

As I said, the issue is not Unocal. The real issue is that we have slipped into a symbiotic relationship with another major power that is neither a free market nor a democracy. We have both grown dependent on that relationship - the U.S. for cheap goods and cheap mortgages, and China for high employment and regime stability. We now have to adjust the bargain at the heart of that relationship. Whether we can do that delicately, without destabilizing Beijing or the global economy, could be the big geopolitical story of 2005.

DURING the cold war, as the Soviet economic system slowly unraveled, internal reform was impossible because highly placed officials who recognized the systemic disorders could not talk about them honestly. The United States is now in an equivalent predicament. Its weakening position in the global trading system is obvious and ominous, yet leaders in politics, business, finance and the news media are not willing to discuss candidly what is happening and why. Instead, they recycle the usual bromides about the benefits of free trade and assurances that everything will work out for the best.

Much like Soviet leaders, the American establishment is enthralled by utopian convictions - the market orthodoxy of free trade globalization. The United States is heading for yet another record trade deficit in 2005, possibly 25 percent larger than last year's. Our economy's international debt position - accumulated from many years of tolerating larger and larger trade deficits - began compounding ferociously in the last five years. Our net foreign indebtedness is now more than 25 percent of gross domestic product and at the current pace will reach 50 percent in four or five years .

For years, elite opinion dismissed the buildup of foreign indebtedness as a trivial issue. Now that it is too large to deny, they concede the trend is "unsustainable." That's an economist's euphemism which means: things cannot go on like this, not without ugly consequences for American living standards. But why alarm the public? The authorities assure us timely policy adjustments will fix the matter.

Reporters and editors typically take cues from the same influential sources and learned experts in business, finance and government. If the news media decided to cast these facts as the story of the world's only superpower losing ground in global competition and becoming financially dependent on strategic rivals like China, the public would take greater notice. But governing elites would regard such clarity as inflammatory. America's awesome trade problem is instead portrayed as something else - an esoteric technical dispute about currency values, the dollar versus the Chinese yuan. The context is guaranteed to baffle and benumb citizens.

The possibility that the United States can no longer afford globalization, at least not as it now functions, is what opinion leaders do not wish to discuss. A few brave dissenters have stated the matter plainly and called for significant policy shifts to stop the hemorrhaging. Warren Buffett, the legendary investor, says the United States is destined to become not an "ownership society," but a "sharecropper society." But his analysis, and others like it, are brushed aside.

An authentic debate might start by asking heretical questions: Why is the United States one of the few advanced economies that suffers from perennial trade deficits? Why do new trade agreements, despite official promises, always leave the United States with a deeper deficit hole, with another wave of jobs moving overseas? How do the authorities explain the 30-year stagnation of working-class wages that is peculiar to America? Are we supposed to believe that everyone else is simply more competitive or slyly breaking the rules? In the last three decades, American policymakers have succeeded in closing the trade gap with only one event - a recession.

The American predicament is shaped by operating dynamics grounded in the global system, singularly embraced by Washington because Washington originated most of them. At the outset, these practices were both virtuous and self-interested for the United States - encouraging industrialization in poor countries, binding cold war allies together with trade and investment, furthering the global advance of American business and finance. With its wide-open market, America played - and still plays - buyer of last resort for world exports. Its leading companies and banks gained access to developing new markets, often by sharing jobs, production and technology with others. American policymakers also got to run the world.

The utopian expectations behind this arrangement turned out to be wrong, judging by empirical evidence rather than theory. But why wrong? American political debate is enveloped by the ideology of free trade, but "free trade" does not actually describe the global economic system. A more accurate description would be "managed trade" - a dense web of bargaining and deal-making among governments and multinational corporations, all with self-interested objectives that the marketplace doesn't determine or deliver. Every sovereign nation, the United States included, uses its vast arsenal of policies to pursue its national interest.

But on the crucial question of how policy makers define "national interest," Washington stands alone. Western Europe, whatever its problems, manages economic policy to maintain modest trade surpluses. Japan manages to insure far larger surpluses in recessions (its export income subsidizes inefficient domestic employers). China strives to acquire a larger, more advanced industrial base at the expense of worker incomes and bank profits. Germany and Japan, despite vast differences, both manage to keep advanced manufacturing sectors anchored at home and to defend domestic wage levels and social guarantees. When they do disperse production and jobs overseas, as they must, they do so strategically.

By contrast, Washington defines "national interest" primarily in terms of advancing the global reach of our multinational enterprises. Elites are persuaded by the reigning orthodoxy that subsidiary domestic interests will ultimately benefit too. The distinctive power of America's globalized companies is reflected in trade patterns. Nearly half of American exports and imports are not traded in open markets - the price auction idealized by neoclassical economics - but within the companies themselves, moving materials and components back and forth among their far-flung factories. A trade deficit does not show on the company's balance sheet, only on the nation's. In recent years, much of the trade deficit has reflected the value-added production and jobs that companies moved elsewhere.

The United States is thus especially vulnerable to the downward pressures on working-class wages that exist on both ends of the global system. American producers are generally free - and even encouraged by Washington - to shift production to low-wage locations. Companies regularly use this cost-cutting technique as a competitive weapon without regard to the domestic consequences. The practice works for companies and investors, but not so well for a nation.

INDEED, the cumulative effects of retarding labor incomes worldwide repeatedly threatens stagnation or worse for the entire system. Workers, to put it crudely, cannot buy what the world can make. Too much capital leads to the speculative "bubbles" that bounce around the world, visiting financial crisis on rich and poor alike.

At a different moment in history, American leadership might have stepped up to these disorders and led the way to solutions. If globalization is to continue without encountering more crisis and random destruction, governments must together shift the balance of power so labor incomes can rise in step with rising productivity and profits. If the United States is to avert its own reckoning, it must take decisive action to draw firm limits on its exposure to trade deficits, that is, resign its position as the open-armed buyer of last resort. In effect, Washington would also reform its own national interest imperatives so that they more closely resemble what other nations already embrace. Ultimately, American remedial action may protect the global system from its own crisis - the moment when trading partners discover they have just lost their best customer.

But to describe plausible remedies is to explain why none are likely. The webs of mutual interests connecting government, corporate boardrooms and Wall Street are too deeply woven, as are habits of thought among policy makers and politicians. So I do not expect anything fundamental will be altered in time. We are going to find out if the dissenters are right.

(Başta Allavi olmak üzere bazı partilere ciddi destek vermek istedi, karar aldı, denedi, sonra Kongre ve NGO’lar karşı çıkınca önce geri adım attı. Ama sonra daha gizli bir şekilde yaptı.)

  .... ‘activities were kept, in part, “off the books”—they were conducted by retired C.I.A. officers and other non-government personnel, and used funds that were not necessarily appropriated by Congress.

..... Bush Administration’s increasing tendency to turn to off-the-books covert actions to accomplish its goals.

... reports of voter intimidation, ballot stuffing, bribery, and the falsification of returns, but the circumstances, and the extent of direct American involvement, could not be confirmed.

... the C.P.A. accepted the reality of voter fraud on the part of the Kurds, whom the Americans viewed as “the only blocking group against the Shiites’ running wild.”

... “People thought that by looking the other way as Kurds voted—man and wife, two times—you’d provide the Kurds with an incentive to remain in a federation.”

... But what the Administration accomplished in its interventions is questionable. The efforts to reduce the Shiites’ plurality, if they had any effect, only delayed their formation of a government, contributing to the instability and disillusionment that have benefitted the insurgency in recent months. The election outcome also strengthened the political hand of the Kurds, who have demanded more autonomy and refused to disband their powerful militias.’.   

The Political Institutions of Modern Representative Democracy

Briefly, the political institutions of modern representative democratic government

are

• Elected officials. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally

vested in officials elected by citizens. Thus modern, large-scale

democratic governments are representative.

• Free, fair and frequent elections. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and

fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.

political institutions and democracy | 189

• Freedom of expression. Citizens have a right to express themselves without

danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including

criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socioeconomic order,

and the prevailing ideology.

• Access to alternative sources of information. Citizens have a right to seek

out alternative and independent sources of information from other citizens,

experts, newspapers, magazines, books, telecommunications, and the like.

Moreover, alternative sources of information actually exist that are not under

the control of the government or any other single political group attempting

to influence public political beliefs and attitudes, and these alternative

sources are effectively protected by law.

• Associational autonomy. To achieve their various rights, including those required

for the effective operation of democratic political institutions, citizens

also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organizations,

including independent political parties and interest groups.

• Inclusive citizenship. No adult permanently residing in the country and subject

to its laws can be denied the rights that are available to others and are

necessary to the five political institutions just listed. These include the right

to vote in the election of officials in free and fair elections; to run for elective

office; to free expression; to form and participate in independent political

organizations; to have access to independent sources of information;

and rights to other liberties and opportunities that may be necessary to the

effective operation of the political institutions of large-scale democracy.

IRAQ is rapidly approaching a watershed moment: the unveiling of its new constitution. This event will probably be seen in retrospect as either the moment that the leaders of Iraq reconsecrated their troubled nation, or as the opening act of the country's descent into civil war. It is troubling, then, that events are proceeding with undue haste and a lack of public input, either of which might doom the process and invite a conflagration that would make the insurgency look like a garden party.

Despite President Bush's no-retreat-no-surrender rhetoric, the military and political truth about Iraq is growing clear: the American military will not defeat this insurgency. The rebels can be defeated only by political reconciliation among Iraqi leaders, and the constitutional process is the essential step.

The purpose of any constitution is to channel conflict and competition into politics. A constitutional process is supposed to translate the political will of a nation into a concrete agreement. But this seems unlikely to occur given the current timetable - the Iraqi government has until Aug. 15 to pass a new constitution and until Oct. 15 to hold a public referendum on it.

If the nascent government is able to devise a constitution by mid-next month, then they're probably missing the point. A constitution cannot be written in a few weeks by a handful of politicians at a conference table; creating a founding document requires the long ordeal of reaching political compromise and building trust. Given the intensity of conflict in Iraq, it is unlikely that broad political consensus can be achieved any time soon.

What Iraqi politicians need more than anything right now is to learn to trust each other. If the Sunnis remain convinced they'll never get a decent shake under Shiite rule, why shouldn't they fight? If the Kurds believe they're better off without the rest of Iraq, why not let the country fall apart? If the Shiites think they will never be able to rule the country peacefully, why shouldn't they do what they can to rule by other means?

If Iraq's leaders end up with a constitution that looks good on paper but doesn't reflect a real political agreement, they will have failed. Not only will the document be ineffective, but the Iraqi people will see the inability to reach a real compromise as a failure of the government as a whole. That way lies civil war.

So what can be done? First, the Iraqis must commit to a meaningful discussion among all factions as they draft the new constitution - and this will take time. The government must stop insisting that it will meet the Aug. 15 deadline and take advantage of the provision in the interim Constitution allowing them an extra six months to come up with a draft.

If a decision to delay were accompanied by a solid timetable for progress, it would not be seen as a sign of weakness but as an indication that the interim government is serious about making things work.

Second, the Iraqis must reshape their constitutional process to make it more inclusive. A first step would be for the Parliament's constitutional committee to hold forums with political leaders, tribal chiefs and average Iraqis around the country. The views of these outsiders should be documented and shared with the entire committee, and also made available to the public. The hard work of compromise must stand on a platform of mutual understanding.

None of this will be easy. The men and women charged with framing the constitution are in mortal danger every day, and there are disputes that no level of discussion will fully resolve. Final decisions on regional autonomy, the distribution of power and the role of Islam will leave many angry. But any constitution that fails to consider all points of view will probably be rejected in the national referendum.

No, a legitimate constitution in and of itself will not destroy the insurgency. But it would provide the most powerful counterinsurgency weapon available to the Iraqi people: a shared vision of a peaceful future and an agreement on how to get there.

J Alexander Thier, director of the Project on Failed States at Stanford University, was a legal adviser to Afghanistan's constitutional and judicial reform commissions

The US has endorsed Japan’s bid for permanent membership of the United Nation’s Security Council, but Gerhard Schröder, the German chancellor, failed to win US support for a seat when he met President George W. Bush last month.

The granting of permanent Security Council seats to either of the two nations, still identified in the UN Charter as “enemy states”, should be determined by three questions. Have they fully overcome the legacy of their responsibility for the second world war? Are they willing and able to undertake the responsibilities of permanent membership? Are future governments in Tokyo and Berlin likely to work co-operatively with Washington?

There is no doubt that both Japan and Germany pass the first two tests. Both have acknowledged their war guilt. Germany has done so more frequently and unequivocally. Both have sought to settle remaining differences and overcome historic antagonisms with their neighbours. Germany has done so more successfully, settling all outstanding territorial disputes and becoming fully reconciled with the victims of its aggression. Japan, in contrast, is still regarded with considerable hostility and suspicion not just by its cold war adversaries, Russia and China, but also by allies such as South Korea and the Philippines.

Japan and Germany are both bigger than Britain or France, and both are more economically powerful than any member of the Security Council except the US. There is, therefore, no doubt as to their capability to sustain the responsibilities of permanent membership. On the other hand, both nations have developed a strong pacifist strain in their foreign and defence policies in reaction to their earlier militarism. Again, both states have moved in recent years to overcome these inhibitions so as to be able to share more fully in the growing burden of international peacekeeping. Germany has moved further than Japan. Tens of thousands of German combat troops have served in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. So far Japan’s military deployments have been limited to smaller numbers of humanitarian personnel, and the troops needed for their immediate protection.

As regards the third test, support for American policy, both states score positively here too. Once more, Iraq excepted, Germany leads. In the aftermath of the September 11 2001 attacks, Germany invoked article five of the Nato charter and dispatched combat forces to Afghanistan in support of the US. There has never been an offer by Japan to send troops to fight alongside American soldiers anywhere. Japan has provided generous economic aid to crisis regions in Asia and beyond, but still lags behind in its willingness to share the risks of military action.

In announcing American opposition to German permanent membership, the State department maintained that Europe was already over-represented on the Security Council. While true, this hardly suffices to explain American policy. Effectively, the State department is arguing that it is unfair for the US to have too many allies on the Security Council, and improbably suggesting that Washington would prefer to see greater representation for its critics from the non-aligned nations of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.

Clearly the State department has had recourse to this bit of diplomatic smoke in order to obscure its true rationale. Japan is being rewarded and Germany is being punished for their stances on Iraq.

The question is whether Washington’s current stance is designed simply to deny Mr Schröder a foreign policy victory before Germany’s national elections this autumn, or whether the US will persist in this attitude thereafter.

Even assuming the intent is purely tactical, Washington’s ploy is likely to be costly. Mr Schröder is not going to be the only German to take Washington’s rebuff personally. Nevertheless, if Washington reverses course after the upcoming German elections, its current opposition may be seen as a tough-minded example of diplomatic hardball. Mr Bush’s equivocal statement after his meeting with Mr Schröder leaves the door open to such a possibility.

But if the US persists in this attitude to the point where Japan gains a permanent seat and Germany does not, then the Bush administration will have turned a temporary rift into an enduring grievance, one which will be remembered by America’s largest European ally long after current differences over Iraq have been forgotten.

After ... referendums and the shameful demonstration of petty national short-termism of the last Brussels summit, what future can be envisaged for the European Union?

The first possible scenario could be described as "the temptation of Venice"; that is, the collective acceptance of decay by an entire continent. In Europe in the 1790s, the end of Venice was inevitable, not just economically but because its political system and constitution were anachronistic in a world transformed by the French Revolution. Incapable of reform, the Republic of Venice had made the wrong choices, politically and diplomatically, at every turning point in the two previous centuries. By the end of the 18th century, the brilliant appearance of the city could no longer hide the vain frivolity of a life that had become a perpetual carnival of both pleasure and frustration, as the inequality between the "haves" and the "have-nots" grew.

Today, witnessing the thousands of middle-class Asian tourists that invade the still magical city-island of Venice, one is seized by a terrible historical comparison. Could Europe be transforming itself into the Venice of the global age; the relic of a civilisation that once dominated the world and failed to re-energise itself after the traumas of two world wars? After a frustrated attempt at becoming a world actor, is Europe resigned to becoming a museum of a once great civilisation that has perfected the art of living well while working little? Rightly or wrongly, most east Asians are convinced that if they earn $100 today they will earn $120 tomorrow and $140 the day after tomorrow. In most of "Old Europe", the opposite attitude prevails: a pessimism that leads all too often to a tendency for protectionism.

The second scenario is no more positive. Instead of turning itself into a giant Venice, Europe would become a Magna Helvetia - a big Switzerland. It would be a prosperous continent with pockets of technological success, a competitive civilian power that compensates for its global political irrelevance with a combination of selfishness and provincialism. Switzerland remained happily neutral in the past 60 years, not only because of its geography and the dedication of its citizens, but because it was surrounded by democratic and benevolent neighbours. But there is no guarantee of stability for a continent that remains a civilian power surrounded by less placid neighbours.

For some, these scenarios do not sound catastrophic. Do they not allude to a future of peace and relative prosperity? This is an unrealistic prospect in an age of terrorism. The problem for Europe in the Venetian or Swiss hypothesis is that it is no longer in control of its destiny. Like Venice in the 18th century, it will depend upon the benevolence of more powerful and dynamic world actors, be they Asians or Americans. The beginning of decadence may be a charming period for civilisations but they do not control the speed of their own decay.

The third scenario is much more disquieting, and could be described as "the revenge of nationalism". In Europe today, one senses the emergence of nasty, populist, jingoistic trends that attack the very essence of the European construction. European countries are not about to make war on each other but their war of words has reached new and destabilising heights. This petty nationalism reveals a weakness in the European project, one that is largely due to great European leaders of the past such as Jacques Delors, the former European Commission president. In his opposition to a European kind of nationalism based on emotion, Mr Delors left Europe vulnerable to the assaults of emotional irrationality. In the French and Dutch referendums, the Yes camp left the weapons of emotion for the sole use of the No camp. Today, no sense of European patriotism can be mobilised to restrain national jingoism.

There is a more optimistic scenario. It starts with a successful British presidency and presupposes a compromise between the various visions of Europe held by the main European actors. Europe's success would be based on enlightened economic self-interest, the survival of some form of a European ideal and, above all, a renewal of leadership in Germany, Italy and France, the key founding members of the Union. For the moment, if anyone has the talent, the conviction and the legitimacy to achieve such a small miracle, it is Tony Blair, the British prime minister. If he fails, the Venetian or Swiss scenarios, not to mention the fall into jingoism, becomes more plausible.

The real threat posed by last week's brutal bombings in London is that the Muslim terrorists who apparently planted the bombs still think they can win. Breaking that psychology is the fundamental challenge for responsible leaders in the West and the Muslim world.

Compare the first statements from both sides, and you can see the essential battle of wills. A group calling itself the Secret Organization of al Qaeda in Europe posted a triumphal statement immediately after the London attacks last Thursday, claiming that "Britain is now burning with fear, terror and panic.". But the attacks showed the determination and resourcefulness of the terrorist underground.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair's first statement after the bombings also went to the heart of the matter: "Our determination to defend our values and our way of life is greater than their determination to cause death and destruction." Later in the day Blair put it more succinctly: "We shall prevail, and they shall not."

But what does "winning" mean, and how does it fit public sentiments on both sides of the battle?

...The terrorists' motivation is outlined in a disturbing new book by political scientist Robert A. Pape, "Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." He analyzed the 315 suicide attacks that occurred around the world from 1980 to 2003 and concluded that in nearly every case terrorists were resisting what they regarded as foreign occupation. Their goal was "to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland"... They turned to suicide attacks because, in their judgment, they worked against democratic societies, which have difficulty absorbing the pain the terrorists can inflict.

Pape quotes a 2003 sermon by Osama bin Laden that focused on what bin Laden saw as America's vulnerability to such attacks.  " ...  If America is hit in one hundredth of these weak spots, God willing, it will stumble, wither away and relinquish world leadership."

"When the public believes the mission will succeed, then the public is willing to continue supporting the mission, even as costs mount. When the public thinks victory is not likely, even small costs will be highly corrosive"  ...   the challenge for the United States and its allies is to define "winning" in an achievable way, so that public support can be maintained. To win ...  "defeat the current pool of terrorists now actively planning to kill Americans" and at the same time "prevent a new, potentially larger generation from rising up." As long as a war can be characterized as resistance to foreign occupation, the terrorists will maintain support from their public.

... to reduce troop levels in Iraq by more than half by early next year and turn over 14 of 18 provinces to Iraqi control. That will allow the United States to focus on training Iraqi security forces, which are the only ones that can stabilize the country in the long run. The administration is also wise to seek a political settlement with Iraq's Sunni Muslims... that "military means alone are not capable of defeating the insurgency."

... terrorists clearly failed to achieve their goals. The West is not terrorized, and Western governments are more united now than before. The West isn't going to lose. But what will "winning" look like?

... whatever the merits of the war in Iraq, it should be clear that we still face a threat at home. Already there have been concerns that some terrorists have left Iraq to return to Europe. Moreover, Islamic anger about the U.S. actions in Iraq, as well as the continuing conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, feeds terrorist recruiting worldwide.

... al-Qaeda has evolved ...

Relentless pressure by the CIA, Special Forces and many other national intelligence and police efforts has made the old, centralized structure of al-Qaeda unworkable.

And we need to keep up the pressure. But al-Qaeda's new threat is decentralized. Thursday's attacks in London have all the earmarks of such a "franchise" operation, locally planned and resourced with relatively modest means, emulating al-Qaeda without the vulnerabilities of centralized resourcing and direction.

Preventing attacks probably can't be accomplished by the administration's preference for taking out "state sponsors." And it's going to be very difficult to employ military means. National intelligence efforts, special police activities and local community policing efforts, which focus on identifying and targeting terrorist individuals and organizations, are required.

Defeat the ideology

But fighting terrorism at home isn't just a matter of "killing terrorists." Terrorists aren't born that way. They are created by their interaction with their surroundings. To win this war, we must defeat the ideology of terrorism, depriving angry young people of their ability to justify their hateful actions in the name of Allah.

This will require not only strong Islamic condemnation of terrorists and their acts, but also a winning dialogue within Islam to defeat Koranic interpretations seeking to justify the use of force against innocent people. We need to encourage "moderates" in Islam to debate, to proselytize and to win over potential terrorists. They are the only ones who can do it.

In the meantime, attention and resources must protect not just the airlines but also U.S. mass transit, rail and other infrastructure. Yet almost four years after 9/11, plans are late and resources lacking.

The latest example: directing the Department of Homeland Security to submit a national strategy for the protection of U.S. transportation by April 1, 2005. The strategy still hasn't been delivered.

Look to civilians

And we are long overdue in forming a volunteer civil defense effort that would not only strengthen our security but also give Americans an opportunity to contribute. Volunteers would be recruited to serve part time on an unpaid basis. They would be trained in emergency response, security procedures and assist in a terrorist incident. By extending full-time emergency and response skills into every neighborhood, it would provide an "official" channel for education, warning and communications within each community.

In addition, the London attacks remind us how much more devastating even decentralized terrorist strikes could be were they to have employed biological, chemical or radiological weapons. The most profound threat we face is a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists. And yet, despite the president's call to "prevent the worst people from getting the worst weapons," efforts to halt the proliferation of weapons have received short shrift. The latest example has been the administration's failure at the recent review conference to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The United States should also intensify efforts to end the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, and bring increased resourcing to the control of Russian fissile materials. In addition, we should be working to develop and implement a verifiable biological weapons treaty and strengthen the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The United States will win the war on terror when we bring to bear all the elements of our power — not just our military might, civilian workforce and diplomatic skills, but also the power to persuade our allies in general and those in the Muslim community specifically to engage the culture of hate and terror and change it to reflect the best in all of us.

Both here at home and in the global community, there can be no spectators in winning the war against terror.

Major reductions in U.S. troop levels in Iraq next year appear increasingly likely, although Pentagon officials said Monday it is too early to predict the specific size and timing.

The Pentagon is eager to pull some of its 135,000 troops out of Iraq in 2006, partly because the counterinsurgency is stretching the Army and Marine Corps perilously thin as casualties mount and partly because officials believe the presence of a large U.S. force is generating tacit support for anti-American violence.

It appears highly unlikely that any significant numbers will be withdrawn before the end of the year. U.S. commanders expect the insurgency to remain at or near its current strength at least until after a scheduled October referendum on a new Iraqi constitution, followed by December elections for a new government.

Attempts by U.S. officials to predict the course of the insurgency have been off the mark, and officials have been forced more than once to scrap plans to reduce the U.S. force in Iraq. The force peaked at about 160,000 in January, when extra troops were needed to bolster security for the elections.

Anthony Cordesman, a defense analyst who closely follows progress in Iraq and visited the country last month, said in an interview that he agrees with U.S. commanders that troop reductions next year are a reasonable goal.

"The probabilities are reasonable," Cordesman said. "Is there a reasonable chance that you can begin a systematic reduction of coalition forces toward the end of the year and watch it move forward in 2006? The answer is yes. But we just don't as yet know" how political and economic progress will unfold.

Bryan Whitman, a senior Pentagon spokesman, declined to comment directly on a leaked British military assessment that raises the possibility of drastically cutting British troop strength in Iraq by the end of next year as well as sharply cutting the overall number of U.S. and allied troops by the middle of next year to 66,000.

"It's not for me to speculate on when there might be a reduction in U.S. forces," he said, adding that U.S. officials have said repeatedly for months that their goal is to begin reductions in 2006 if conditions permit.

"We look at the conditions as being the determining factor as to what the U.S. presence there needs to be, and we have contingencies for an increased presence, a steady state, and also a decreased presence," Whitman said.

The Pentagon missed a Monday deadline for submitting a report to Congress on progress in shifting security responsibilities to the Iraqis and projecting how many U.S. troops would be needed there next year. Lt. Col. Rose-Ann Lynch, a Pentagon spokeswoman, said Congress was informed that the report is still in the works.

At the White House, spokesman Scott McClellan told reporters that President Bush is relying on commanders in Iraq to judge when the time is right to adjust the level of U.S. forces, based in part on an assessment of how capable the U.S.-trained Iraqi government forces are of fighting the insurgency on their own.

Michael O'Hanlon, a defense specialist at the Brookings Institution think tank, said the training of Iraqi forces has progressed to the point when they will be capable of taking on a greater part of the responsibility.

"If you think in terms of simple tasks and hard tasks, and tougher and easier parts of the country, I think you can see a much greater role for the Iraqis starting next year, even if they also will have a long ways to go then," he said.

O'Hanlon said he is hopeful that the 135,000-strong U.S. force could be cut by as much as 50 percent by mid-2006.

Bush administration officials and U.S. commanders are eager to reduce the U.S. military presence in Iraq as soon as possible _ not least because of the psychological burden imposed by the presence of an occupation force.

Lt. Gen. John Vines, the commander in charge of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, told reporters last month there is a "certain element of tacit support" for anti-U.S. feeling among Iraqis that is derived from the presence of foreign forces. He suggested the U.S. might reduce by 20,00-25,000 troops sometime in 2006.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has made the point recently that ultimately it will fall to the Iraqis themselves to defeat the insurgency.

"Insurgencies by their nature need to be defeated by the country, the people of the country," he said in a radio interview July 5. "A foreign occupying force really can't do that as effectively."

KEY FINDINGS

** Critics charge the U.S. aims to "collapse the joint front" of the G-4's quest to join the UNSC.

** Media in the G-4 countries see an "impasse in the UN reform process."

** Papers say U.S. policy aims to contain "China's increasing influence."

** Outlets note that most countries "strongly resist" extending the veto right at the UNSC.

MAJOR FINDINGS

'Devious move to sow division' among the G-4-- Critics assailed the U.S.' "subtle and deceptive" response to the G-4's effort to join the UNSC, adding that the U.S. is focusing on its own "political and military aims." Dubbing the U.S.' implicit approval of India and Japan's entry into the UNSC a "brazen attempt to break the G-4's solidarity," India's centrist Telegraph alleged Washington "only supports countries which it can hope to manipulate." India's right-of-center Pioneer concluded the U.S.' "dilatory tactics" had the "explicit purpose of delaying, if not scuppering," UNSC expansion. Syria's government-owned Al-Thawra alleged the U.S. wants the UNSC to "serve its ambitions of controlling the world."

'Mere wishful thinking'-- Terming UNSC expansion "unfeasible," numerous G-4 observers concluded the "abiding dream" of joining the UNSC was a "classic case of wishful thinking." Brazil's center-right O Estado de S. Paulo advised Brasilia to "consider realistically Brazil's true possibilities," while Germany's leftist die tageszeitung labeled Berlin's quest for a permanent seat a "dead man walking." Other papers dismissed UNSC expansion as "political symbolism," calling for UN reform to focus on "increasing efficiency and effectiveness." Russia's business-oriented Kommersant predicted a "radically enlarged" UNSC would be another "League of Nations" and prove "unable to solve a single problem."

'China is determined to block' Japan-- Global papers contrasted the U.S.' "open support for Japan's candidacy" with China's "clear strategy to restrain Japan's bid." Most argued that Washington aimed to "balance China's influence" through its backing for Japan and India. China's official World News Journal accused Washington of seeking to "construct a geopolitical environment to contain" China; as UNSC members, India and Japan would likely "vote aligned with the U.S." Japan's conservative Sankei noted Tokyo and Washington shared concerns over the "negative effects from China's increasing influence."

Giving new UNSC members the veto is 'neither feasible nor desirable'-- G-4 media acknowledged that dropping the demand for the UNSC veto was a "wise decision." Germany's left-of-center Berliner Zeitung opposed increasing the number of countries that "could thwart the decision of the rest of the world with a simple 'no,'" while India's pro-BJP Dinamani hailed the G-4's "practical and timely" decision to surrender their veto demand. Several outlets rejected the veto concept. Norway's social-democratic Dagsavisen declared the veto right should not be expanded: "five are already five too many." Pakistan's center-left Dawn agreed the "continuation of the veto power goes against the spirit of democracy."

'...the tension between (Bush's) commitment to democracy and longstanding U.S. security and economic commitments grows steadily more acute. ... whether to endorse ... Mubarak's half-baked presidential election; ... the dilemma of ... Karimov, who massacred hundreds of protesters in one town but continues to host a U.S. military base in another.

Next up: Azerbaijan, an oil-rich ... hosts big U.S. oil companies, a new strategic pipeline for their products, a refueling stop for U.S. military planes -- and a government teetering between consolidating a corrupt autocracy and embracing democratic reforms.

... Azerbaijan resembles Ukraine a year ago ... similar wobble... a fraudulent election, followed by a democratic revolution. Like ... Kuchma ... Aliyev -- who was elected amid some blatant ballot-box stuffing two years ago -- has promised to hold free and fair parliamentary elections this November. ... Bush administration is trying to push the president to keep his word, without pushing so hard that he ends up in the arms of dictator-friendly Russia or China, or reverses his cooperation with the Pentagon and American oil companies.

Azerbaijan's well-developed political opposition and civil society meanwhile is deliberately modeling itself on the democracy movements of Ukraine and neighboring Georgia. It has built a coalition, chosen a protest color (orange), and united around a demand that the elections be free and fair. If they are not, the opposition will call Azeris to the streets. Already, thousands joined two anti-government demonstrations ...

"We have learned many important lessons from our Georgian colleagues and our Ukrainian colleagues," says Isa Gambar ... "We are studying very closely their method for coming to power peacefully, and trying to follow their example."

The Azeri opposition is not as united or popular as that of Ukraine or Georgia. But the challengers are far better organized and competent than those in many other Muslim countries. Gambar, who once served as an interim president, says the opposition supports free-market capitalism and the integration of Azerbaijan into NATO and the European Union.

Aliyev .. 43-year-old son of a former Soviet politburo member who ruled Azerbaijan for a decade before installing him in office. The rigged election ... the beating and mass arrest of protesters. Still, the secular and Western-educated president regularly charms his American and European visitors. Sipping whiskey and speaking fluent English, he tells them he is genuinely committed to making his country a democratic Western ally.

Given the U.S. oil and security interests, Bush administration policymakers would love to believe him. But should they? Skeptics, including some who have been listening to the young Aliyev's pitch for several years without noting any significant change in Azerbaijan, say the administration risks creating another Egypt: a government that delivers economic and security cooperation and mouths words about democracy while practicing de facto dictatorship. As massive oil revenues begin to flow into Baku, U.S. acceptance of another rigged election this year could cement Aliyev into just another president-for-life.

Administration officials say they understand the risk and have made a fair Azeri election a top policy priority. "We are using every bit of leverage we can muster," one official told me. That includes deferring, for the moment, a prize Aliyev very much wants: a pre-election visit to Washington for a White House meeting with Bush. The Azeris have been told a date won't be set until it becomes clear whether the president will follow through on his promises, including a 13-point plan for the elections he recently unveiled.

So far the signs are mixed. After suppressing one opposition rally in May, the government allowed the two last month. It has opened a dialogue with opposition leaders, and there is talk that Aliyev will agree to debate his opponents on national television. But Gambar says the opposition still isn't allowed to rally or organize outside the capital and has no access to state media. Electoral commissions at the national and provincial level are still dominated by the government apparatchiks who falsified the 2003 vote.

At best, Azerbaijan could deliver a breakthrough for the Bush administration: a historic free election that would end up strengthening its ally Aliyev. At worst Bush will have to choose this November between another oil-rich autocrat and pro-democracy demonstrators who have taken his inaugural address to heart. Either way, a strategic Muslim country that hasn't gotten much attention in Washington since 2001 will soon be in the spotlight.

'... The Pentagon's most senior planners are challenging the longstanding strategy that requires the armed forces to be prepared to fight two major wars at a time. Instead, they are weighing whether to shape the military to mount one conventional campaign while devoting more resources to defending American territory and antiterrorism efforts.

... top-to-bottom review of Pentagon strategy, as ordered by Congress every four years, and will determine the future size of the military as well as the fate of hundreds of billions of dollars in new weapons.

.... burden of maintaining forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the other demands of the global campaign against terrorism, may force a change in the assumptions ...

... concentration of troops and weapons in Iraq and Afghanistan was limiting the Pentagon's ability to deal with other potential armed conflicts ... the current review is the first by the Pentagon in decades to seriously question the wisdom of the two-war strategy.

The two-war model provides enough people and weapons to mount a major campaign ... while maintaining enough reserves to respond in a similar manner elsewhere.

An official designation of a counterterrorism role and a shift to a strategy that focuses on domestic defense would have a huge impact on the size and composition of the military.

In a nutshell, strategies that order the military to be prepared for two wars would argue for more high-technology weapons, in particular warplanes. An emphasis on one war and counterterrorism duties would require lighter, more agile forces - perhaps fewer troops, but more Special Operations units - and a range of other needs, such as intelligence, language and communications specialists.

Civilian and military officials are trying to decide to what degree to acknowledge that operations like the continuing presence in Iraq - not a full-blown conventional war, but a prolonged commitment - may be such a burden that it would not be possible to also fight two full-scale campaigns elsewhere.

... the unusual mission in Iraq ... is neither a major conventional combat nor a mere peacekeeping operation. It does not require the full array of forces, especially from the Navy and the Air Force, of a conventional war, and it takes far more troops than peacekeeping ordinarily would.

... administration describes the campaign not as a major conventional war, but as the leading effort in the nation's fight against terrorism.

"The war in Iraq requires a very large ground-force presence," said Loren Thompson, an analyst at the Lexington Institute, a policy research center in Arlington, Va. "War with China or North Korea or Iran, the other countries mentioned in the major review scenarios, would require a much more capable Navy and Air Force."

.... "what we need for conventional victory is different from what we need for fighting nsurgents, and fighting insurgents has relatively little connection to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. We can't afford it all."

... the Quadrennial Defense Review, is not due to be completed until early next year ... the review cannot ignore the mounting costs of the war in Iraq, approximately $5 billion a month.

... The current military strategy is known by a numerical label, 1-4-2-1, with the first number representing the defense of American territory. That is followed by numbers representing the ability to deter hostilities in four critical areas of the world, and to swiftly defeat two adversaries in near-simultaneous major combat operations The final number stands for a requirement that the military retain the capability, at the same time, to decisively defeat one of those two adversaries, which would include capturing a capital and toppling a government.

... where the military's heavy commitment to the fight against terrorism fits into the current strategy formula ... "It wasn't there when they came up with 1-4-2-1." If a new strategy emerges from the review, he said, it might be "something that doesn't have any numbers at all."

... "an effort to create a construct that will bring a better balance" among domestic defense, the antiterrorism campaign and conventional military requirements.

After years of saying American forces were sufficient for a two-war strategy, "we've come to the realization that we're not," ... "It's coming to grips with reality."

Senior leaders are trying to develop strategies that will do a better job of addressing the requirements of antiterrorism and domestic defense, while acknowledging that future American wars will most likely be irregular - against urban guerrillas and insurgents - rather than conventional.

... Under Gordon R. England, nominated to succeed Paul D. Wolfowitz as deputy defense secretary, more than 150 questions that the review should address have been sorted into 36 major themes. They include such things as balancing reserve and active-duty forces; the role of other agencies in domestic security; combat medicine; the ability of foreign coastal powers to keep American forces at a distance; and the ability to attract people with important skills, such as a knowledge of the Arabic language.

The review is analyzing in detail what would happen if the United States had to fight China, North Korea or Iran.

..."Whether anybody believed we could actually fight two wars at once is open to debate," one senior military officer said. "But having it in the strategy raised enough uncertainty in the minds of our opponents that it served as a deterrent. Do we want to lose that? We don't want to give any adversary the confidence that they could take advantage of us while we're engaged in one major combat operation."

'...our primary problem in Iraq is not terrorism ... , focus on terrorism may help explain why we have not yet adopted a true counterinsurgency strategy ...

... parallels between Iraq and Vietnam are ... wrong. Iraq is far more important. Because of its oil ... location ... its importance in the eyes of Arab nations that wonder if democracy is possible for them too, Iraq is critical to American interests in a way that Vietnam never was.

... one way ... in which Iraq is like Vietnam: how the United States is handling it. ...in Vietnam ... We focused more on hunting down Vietcong guerrillas than on protecting the Vietnamese people, which in turn prevented the South Vietnamese economy from growing and giving the people an economic incentive to support our side of the war. We also tolerated a series of corrupt, unstable South Vietnamese leaders who made little effort to connect with the people and spent their time squabbling over power and graft.

Iraq ... may not be doomed to the same fate. al-Jaafari and his government are far more popular and better-intentioned than ... Diem of Vietnam and his kleptocratic colleagues ... And, because the Iraqi insurgents are as happy to blow up Iraqi civilians as American convoys, they do not enjoy the broad appeal of the Vietcong (let alone the firepower of the North Vietnamese Army).

...we are ... alienating the Iraqi people and raising the risk of chaos and civil war. So how do we save the reconstruction of Iraq? ... five specific lessons ...

Think safety first

... ensuring the safety of the people and giving them an economic and political incentive to oppose the insurgency is more important than fighting the insurgents themselves. Insurgencies wither on the vine without popular support. ... de-emphasize chasing insurgents around the Sunni Triangle, and to instead put a higher priority on protecting Iraqis as they go about their daily lives.

Many Iraqis ... less concerned about terrorist attacks than about street crime and the burgeoning organized crime syndicates, which scare them into staying home and hinder the distribution of goods, paralyzing Iraq's economic and social life.

... our operations ... antagonize the Sunni tribes of western Iraq. We should instead be building safe zones in cities and rural areas, and guarding communications and transportation sites, to allow Iraq's political and economic life to revive. We need to shift the bulk of our troops from trying to pacify insurgent hotspots that may never support reconstruction and toward keeping the peace in areas dominated by Shiites and urban Sunnis, who for the most part want nothing to do with the insurgency but long to live normal lives. (Fortunately, Kurdish security forces are more than adequate to police their own streets without our help.)

Provide enough manpower for the job

... safe streets, jobs, clean water, reliable electricity, ample gasoline and the provision of other basics ... require more than the 155,000 troops ... bite the bullet, whether by deploying additional standing forces, calling up reserves, or spurring recruitment by increasing pay and benefits

... American troops need to be on the streets, patrolling on foot with Iraqis, to reassure civilians. ... create a safe "space" for Iraq's economy and society to revive.

Let them learn

...Iraqi security forces ... it would take three to five years before they could take over from American troops. ... Unfortunately, we have regularly rushed Iraqi units into frontline duty before they were ready ...

...they need time, years perhaps, to develop command relationships, unit cohesion and a sense of commitment to the community.

Get beyond Baghdad

The capital has become a giant bottleneck ... Iraq's transitional government consists of a large number of political parties whose true popularity is unclear at best. Many Shiites .. voted for the United Iraqi Alliance list because ... Sistani encouraged them to do so ... Yet, unsurprisingly, many of these parties are using their positions to secure as big a piece of Iraq's economic pie as possible ...

Perhaps the most underreported story in Iraq today is the theft of its oil revenues. ... Iraq should make well over $20 billion from oil sales this year, yet almost none of this money seems to be going to actual reconstruction projects.

... politicians ... prevent any delegation of authority or direct distribution of money or supplies to provincial or local officials. This tendency to keep things centralized is reinforced because the American Embassy's personnel cannot leave the capital ...

Reconstruction is most likely to succeed if it can grow from the bottom up. ... We need more American civilians and international aid workers to move about in Iraq and find out what the people are getting and what they desperately need. ... push resources out from Baghdad or circumvent it, shipping supplies directly into the hands of the Iraqis who can help at the local level.

Buy off the Sunni sheiks

... bringing the Sunni population - particularly the tribes that are the principal supporters of the insurgency - into the Iraqi government and making them feel that they have a stake in the system is critical to long-term stability. In the shorter term .. pay them protection money.

Buying your enemies may sound un-American, but it is a time-honored tradition in Iraq. ... throughout the history of modern Iraq, these chieftains were paid by whoever was in power in Baghdad (the Turks, the British, the dictators, the Baathists) to refrain from attacking the roads and government facilities and to keep other groups from doing so.

... if we're going to succeed in stabilizing Iraq and defeating its insurgency, we are going to have to make a radical shift to a traditional counterinsurgency strategy, even though it could be politically very painful....

'The painful process of opening the European Union to full membership for Turkey ... a decision taken with little apparent enthusiasm.

Poor Turkey. After 42 years in the waiting room, the timing of the start of formal negotiations could scarcely be worse. The mandate still has to be approved unanimously by the 25 member states ... that can no longer be taken for granted.

The question must be asked whether the EU member states are embarking on a process whose conclusion they cannot deliver.

For the first time, accession talks with a would-be EU member are being held with a deliberate statement that they are "open-ended". There is no guarantee that they will be successfully concluded.

The No votes... were not primarily about Turkish membership. Only 6 per cent of French voters and 3 per cent of the Dutch cited Turkey as a reason for dumping the treaty. Yet the issue was always in the background. ... Sarkozy ... says Turkey should not come into the club. Welcome to the future.

So what of the mood in Turkey itself? Not surprisingly, there is evidence of resentment and a rising tone of nationalism at what is seen as interminable EU prevarication ... The fear is that the EU keeps raising the entry barrier because its member states do not want Turkey to come in at all.

... accusations that the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan made excessive concessions for a Cyprus settlement, without any reward. There is trouble brewing from the more devout Muslims inside ... AK party, too....

If the membership talks are launched on time, the affronts to Turkey's acute sense of national dignity are likely to get worse. Even if they are called "negotiations", that is not the reality. The onus will all be on Turkey to adapt its laws to the EU book of rules. The only concessions will be on temporary delays in implementing them.

Cyprus will be one very sensitive issue. It is unthinkable that Turkey would be allowed into the European club as long as it keeps Turkish troops in Cyprus. Yet withdrawal would be seen as a national defeat. The other explosive demand will be to reopen Turkey's border with Armenia in the east, and allow objective investigation of the long-standing accusation that Turks committed genocide against Armenians in 1915. That subject is virtually taboo in Ankara ...

... 75 per cent of the Turkish population support EU membership but more than 80 per cent would be unhappy if it meant any loss of national sovereignty. The idea that some sovereignty will be transferred to Brussels has not got through to the voters. It could come as a rude shock.

The political reality is that enlargement indigestion in the EU has made voters and governments more defensive and nationalistic. ... On the other hand, if the EU process of integration were halted, it would be easier for Turkey to join a looser federation. What Ankara does not want is to be a second class member. The geopolitical arguments in favour of Turkish membership are very strong: it will bring economic dynamism, wider regional security and global clout to the Union. But those are far removed from ordinary voters who are more concerned about unemployment and cheap competition.

The EU is caught between two equally unacceptable alternatives. To abandon the negotiating process now would be to invite a furious nationalist backlash in Turkey. Yet it might well be worse to negotiate for 10 years, reach a successful conclusion and then have it rejected by a referendum in France or Austria.

If EU leaders are genuine in their belief that Turkey should join, they must get on the streets and sell the idea to their voters. The danger is that they will pass the buck and leave that job to their successors.

The insurgency is brought fully under control within a year or so, by a combination of US military capabilities and the rapid development of the Iraqi security forces, and a government is in place in Baghdad that is supportive of the United States.

... 2. Redeployment of US Forces in Iraq

... maintenance of a substantial US military force at the designated permanent bases in Iraq but also in a number of other bases away from the major centres of population.

... 3. US Withdrawal

... a complete change of policy in Washington involving an acceptance that the Iraq operation is a disaster and that the only option is a rapid US withdrawal, even before Iraqi security forces can be expected to maintain control.

... 4. Endless Insurgency

... insurgency lasts indefinitely, becoming something of a stalemate between weak Iraqi security forces that cannot maintain the security of the state on their own, backed by the US military presence, and insurgents who cannot develop sufficient strength to threaten the Iraqi government or cause an American withdrawal. '

'US foreign policy is getting better - and that's partly because Iraq has got worse

... America ... a nation sobered by reality. The reality of debt and lost jobs. ... rising China. ... of Iraq.

... Bush's speech ... the audience interrupted him with applause just once.

... a deafening silence. ... soldiers ... looking slightly bored

...The eerie silence made Bush look, at moments, like a stand-up comic whose jokes were falling flat

... Three years ago ... Iraq was not then a recruiting sergeant or training ground for jihadist terrorists. Now it is.

... Wesley Clark puts it plainly: "We are creating enemies."

... (Bush:) our great achievement will be to prevent Iraq becoming another Taliban-style, al-Qaida-harbouring Afghanistan! This is like a man who shoots himself in the foot and then says: "We must prevent it turning gangrenous, then you'll understand why I was right to shoot myself in the foot."

... whether or not the invasion of Iraq was a crime, it's now clear that ... it was a massive blunder.

... the American people are beginning to see this. ... 53% ... said it was a mistake to go into Iraq. Just 40% approved of how he has handled Iraq, down from 50% ... last November. Contrary to what many Europeans believe, you can fool some of the Americans all of the time, and all of the Americans some of the time, but you can't fool most Americans most of the time - even with the help of Fox News. Reality gets through. Hence the new sobriety.

... neocons are no longer calling the shots. ... nominations of Wolfowitz to head the World Bank and Bolton to be ambassador to the UN actually show they have been kicked upstairs.

... Everyone stresses the importance of allies.

... The state department, under Rice, is setting out to repair old American alliances and to forge new ones. One of America's most dynamically developing alliances is with India, a country in which America is also much loved. If ... schadenfreude at the crisis of the EU, they are not showing it.

... On Iran, which even six months ago threatened to become a new Iraq crisis, the US is letting the so-called E3 ... take the diplomatic lead.

... And if the European diplomacy with Iran does not work, what is Washington's plan B? To take the issue to the United Nations! What a difference three years make.

... dumb for any European to think, in relation to Iraq, "the worse the better".

... But it is a fair and justified historical observation that American policy has got better - more sober, more realistic - at least partly because things in Iraq have gone so badly. This is the cunning of history. '

'... she has bridged the divide between State and the White House

... right where she wanted to be: refocusing the foreign policy of Bush on diplomacy.

... taken the Bush administration beyond the divisions that marked the first term's foreign policy, confidently filling the shoes that never seemed to fit so well on Colin Powell. ... First, she has bridged the divide that separated the Bush White House from the State Department, remaining the president's top foreign-policy adviser - and sounding board - even after the transfer to Foggy Bottom.

Second, as she talks to the world about America's global mission of democratization and the spread of freedom as envisioned by her boss, she is deftly using a life story that rings true and genuine even to America's skeptics. ... the tale of an African-American girl from segregated Alabama who rose through a changing society ...

... put herself in control of a new building and bureaucracy at the State Department, without giving up much of the power she wielded at the White House as the president's national security adviser.

... "She is probably the most powerful secretary of State in decades."

... another, tougher side - some say even stubbornly undiplomatic at times. ... singled out Syria among neighboring countries that she said need to do more to help stabilize Iraq ...

It was Condi the diplomat, accented by a little reminder of Condi the tough cookie. ... a combination that is capturing the world's attention.

"... Rice has convinced the president that diplomacy should be tried before other means... also ... that ... she can take a tough line: She has a tough line on Iran; she is tough on Russia."

... one of Rice's strengths is the strong team she has assembled. ... Robert Zoellick ... Philip Zelikow...

But it is Rice's relationship with President Bush that makes her stand out ...

"The Europeans liked Colin Powell, but that didn't matter so much once they realized he wasn't going to be able to deliver the president. But she can"

... issues that are being handled differently - with more consultation and a higher priority on finding common ground .... Iraq and Iran and extending to the approach to militant groups playing a role in Middle East political reform.

... Bush's recent suggestion that the US could work with groups that forswear violence to enter electoral politics ...

... the change in US foreign- policymaking under Rice has been quickly grasped by the "elites" of key partners, particularly in Europe.

But ... a perception of change has not yet trickled down to the media and the general population of many countries.

... Rice's honest discussion of America's flaws, and how one woman of color saw them change and overcame them, is having an impact with foreign audiences.

... whether Rice's approach of a steely diplomacy - but diplomacy all the same - is going to make a difference. A test ... choices on Iran and its nuclear program, or the Israeli-Palestinian peace process after the Gaza withdrawal.

"If Iran gets harder after its elections or the Middle East deteriorates, are we going to be able to stick together? ... a clear shift under Rice, but we haven't had any major successes yet, and the problems are getting harder, not easier." '

'How will the story of the "global imbalances" end? How should the policy changes needed to avert the worst outcomes be organised?

(In US)... low real interest rates,rapid credit expansion, a weakening dollar, monetary expansion in countries resisting exchange rate appreciation, lax fiscal policies and rising commodity prices (especially oil).

... Imagine that oil prices jumped above $100 a barrel. Imagine, too, that external official support for the US dollar were to be withdrawn, perhaps because of rising fears over domestic inflation in creditor countries.

... If long-term US interest rates then rose sharply, it would be almost impossible for the Federal Reserve to cut short-term interest rates. Highly indebted US households would cut spending. The consequent recession would spread rapidly worldwide.

... The exchange rate policies of east Asia ... generate large current account surpluses, sizeable inflows of capital and huge reserve accumulations, the monetary impact of which is then sterilised instead of allowed to work through the economy. Excess savings are the result.

Meanwhile, US ... generate sufficient demand to sustain domestic output in line with potential. Today, demand must be about 6 per cent bigger than potential supply to offset the external deficit. The policies needed to sustain demand include large fiscal deficits and monetary policies that keep the private sector spending at historically unprecedented levels in relation to income. The asset price bubbles are no accident. They are a necessary component of the mechanism that generates the needed US demand. Thus the policies that thwart market-led adjustment are creating monetary disorder.

So what is to be done? One answer is: nothing. Let each country choose the policies that make sense to it. ... late 1980s ... US current account deficit was then much smaller in relation to gross domestic product; the movement of the real exchange rate was also far bigger than it has been this time; and relative growth rates of trading partners were also much more helpful.

The dangers will grow if correction does not begin soon. One such danger is protectionist pressure not only in the US but elsewhere. ... a big reduction in the US current account deficit that does not include sizeable exchange rate and macroeconomic adjustments in Asia would impose a devastating shock on the already troubled eurozone.* Maintenance of liberal trade in Europe would prove impossible.

Without big change in policies, the situation seems certain to deteriorate: US net liabilities will continue to rise in relation to GDP; and so, quite possibly, will the current account deficit. The longer this goes on, the larger the ultimate adjustment will be.

A second answer is: rely on the US's big stick. Under this alternative, the US would bully China into making a big adjustment of its exchange rate and macroeconomic policies. But there are three huge objections: first, China is far from the only country that needs to change its policies; second, the Chinese would find making such concessions to public pressure from the US an intolerable repetition of the humiliations they endured in the 19th and 20th centuries; and, third, they would almost certainly do the bare minimum, which would exacerbate ill will without rectifying the situation.

This leaves a third answer: serious multilateral discussion in which the US leads but does not attempt to dictate. The right way to approach the Asians, and particularly the Chinese, is by discussing their responsibility for the health of an open world economy on which all depend. As a rising power, China should be invited to share in these discussions, by both exercising its voice and implementing its share of policy changes.

Those changes must be large. They should include reform of the International Monetary Fund, to make it relevant to today's world, and a radical restructuring of the increasingly absurd Group of Eight. A forum must be found, together with a permanent secretariat, that makes possible serious discussion of how to proceed among the players that matter.

The reason this is so important is that the policy adjustments required of China and other Asian countries are large and complex. It is only by understanding their concerns that there will be a reasonable chance of reaching a workable and sustainable solution.

The US cannot dictate the policy changes or the pattern of global payments it desires to its partners. It must rely on institutions of co-operation, instead. ...

US leadership is missing in action but remains indispensable. Leadership means seeking a way to reconcile the vital interests of all the important players. For this the present G8 is irrelevant.... better institutions and a deeper dialogue with the right partners. '

'... Chinese-made cars ... China to follow Japan and South Korea in building itself into a global competitor in one of the cornerstones of the industrial economy.

... foretells a broader challenge to a half-century of American economic and political ascendance. The nation's manufacturing companies are building wealth at a remarkable rate, using some of that money to buy assets abroad. And China has been scouring the world to acquire energy resources, with the bid to buy an American oil company only the latest overture.

... fierce domestic competition and a faster accumulation of financial assets are laying the groundwork for the arc of China's rise to be far greater than Japan's.

... China's economy has risen rapidly with foreign expertise and investment.

... bilateral corporate tango - in contrast to the confrontations reminiscent of the 1980's and early 1990's when Japanese capital poured into the United States - means that China has many American corporate comrades, who have a stake in helping generate its growth.

... China ... not face some of the inherent limitations that ultimately stymied Japan and led to economic stagnation there over the last 14 years. With its giant population, China is developing a large and diverse economy, creating an almost Darwinian competition for a domestic market that has extremely low-cost companies ready to export inexpensive goods around the globe.

... "The economy is much more flexible, adaptable than Japan's, .... Being a continental economy is an advantage because it has competition within."

... China is still at an earlier stage of development than was Japan when its economic rise became a national obsession in the United States

... China's growing ability to finance any political and military ambitions. China has missiles with nuclear weapons that intelligence experts describe as already able to hit not just Hawaii but probably California. Beijing also remains chilly toward American entreaties to put more pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program.

... In contrast, Japan's military dependence on the United States made it more willing to accept a steep appreciation in the yen in 1985 that hobbled Japanese exporters. So far, China has put off Bush administration demands to let its yuan appreciate.

... But China's economic rise also faces many obstacles. Its banks have huge portfolios of nonperforming loans that have not yet become a crippling problem because of rapid growth, but that could, as in Japan, make a recession someday even harder to combat.

Banks suffering from fraud and political pressures have frequently made poor decisions on which borrowers should receive loans, so that China requires more investment for each dollar of economic growth than many rivals. ... China and Japan shared weak traditions of corporate governance, shareholder rights and the rule of law, and this has hurt efficiency.

... "Efficiency rules the game and will decide who wins the game, and not how fast a country grows,"

... China also has a one-party political system that has not changed nearly as quickly as its economy over the last quarter-century, and a population that will soon start to age rapidly because of the "one child" policy. ... from 2015 to 2030, China's labor force will drop to 813 million from 842 million, as India's rises.

... The big question is how smoothly China will make the transition from central planning to capitalism.

... (Chinese workers)... working as quickly as workers in American factories - but earning roughly $1.50 an hour in wages and benefits, compared with $55 an hour for General Motors and Ford factories in the United States.

... One question is how China can retain the political stability ... while moving toward more democratic processes that the Communist Party has long claimed as its goal '

'... Iraq: A conflict that the United States cannot easily lose, but also cannot easily win.

... I don't see how Iraq's insurgency can win. It lacks the support of at least 80 percent of the country (Shiites and Kurds), and ... lacks the support of the majority of the Sunni ... has no positive agenda, no charismatic leader, virtually no territory of its own, and no great power suppliers. That's why parallels to Vietnam and Algeria don't make sense. But despite all these obstacles, the insurgents launched 700 attacks against U.S. forces last month, the highest number since the invasion.

... getting more sophisticated ... kill enough civilians every week that Iraq remains insecure, and electricity, water and oil are still supplied in starts and stops.

...The positive picture ... successful elections, a new (and more legitimate) government, Sunnis included into the political process, and is working on a new constitution. The insurgents' attacks on ordinary Iraqis are having the predictable effect of making them lose popular support. ... Iraqi politicians have been more mature and steadfast than one could have ever hoped for—making compromises, arriving at consensus and moving forward under tremendous personal danger.

... What I worry ... not a ... Vietnam. It is something different. If the insurgents keep up their attacks, prevent reconstruction and renewed economic activity and, most important, continue to attract jihadists to Iraq from all over the region and the world. ... leaked CIA report ... Iraq as the new on-the-ground training center for Islamic extremists ... If thousands of jihadists hone their skills in the streets and back alleys of Iraq and then return to their countries, it could mark the beginning of a new wave of sophisticated terror. Just as Al Qaeda was born in the killing fields of Afghanistan, new groups could grow in the back alleys of Iraq. ... kids with no previous track record of terror. Some even have European passports ... they will be very difficult to screen out of the United States or any other country.

...by the fall of 2006, it will be virtually impossible to maintain current troop levels in Iraq because the use of reserve forces will have been stretched to the limit. That's when pressure to bring the boys home will become irresistible. ... bad news for the Iraqi government, which is still extremely weak and in many areas dysfunctional.

The good news is that America has stopped blundering in Iraq. ... since late 2004, Washington has been urging political inclusion, speeding up economic reconstruction and building up local forces. But U.S. policy still lacks central direction—and the energy, vision, increased resources and push that such direction would bring. Who is running Iraq policy in Washington?

The intense and bitter interagency squabbles of the past three years ... have left Iraq something of an orphan. Day to day, Iraq policy is now run by the State Department and the U.S. Army, but those two chains of command never meet.

On the civilian side ... American effort is massively understaffed. "I've had 25-year-old sergeants adjudicating claims between Turkomans and Kurds, when they don't really know how they are different..."

The vacuum is being filled by the U.S. Army, which has been building bridges and schools, securing neighborhoods and power plants and, yes, adjudicating claims between Turkomans and Kurds. ... because someone has to. ... Rumsfeld has long argued that American troops should never engage in nation building, leaving that to locals. But while we waited for Iraqis to do it, chaos broke out and terror reigned. So the Army on the ground has ignored Rumsfeld's ideology and has simply made things work. (It's a good rule of thumb for the future.)

...we need a full-scale revitalization of Iraq policy, with resources to match it. '

Just as the United States is rethinking its approach to the Middle East, some people in the Middle East are starting to rethink their reliance on the United States - and they are turning to Asia for help.

... a senior Egyptian diplomat told an audience in Singapore .... that trying to buy democracy with development assistance was a "cheap, unethical bargain."

... that while relations between the Middle East and the West have been historically difficult, "there are no deep historical, cultural, religious or ideological barriers preventing better relations between the Middle East and Asia."

... the idea of autocratic Arab states finding solace and refuge in soft-authoritarian Asia. ... belief that the process of democracy "should take root through evolution and not through revolution" resonates strongly in Asia, where democracy has been slow to evolve.

... peace process in the Middle East needs an injection of fresh thinking. Could this come from Asia?

... "Asia is qualified to play a role ... We are the East, be it the Far East, the Near East or the Middle East. Our common experience with the West was colonialism, so we have more in common than we have with the West." ... a need for genuinely neutral and disinterested parties to join the quest for peace ...

But an Asian contribution ... would require a significant rewiring of the diplomatic grid. China would need to weigh in with its newfound global clout. The United Nations would have to play a bigger role than it currently does, consigned as it is to the weaker corner of the current "quartet" with the United States, Europe and Russia.

... need to start dealing with the problem without regarding all the players as security risks - without seeing everything through the lens of counterterrorism.

... The Middle East has started looking to Asia for trade and expertise. Countries like Saudi Arabia feel mistrusted in the West, and now find the fastest growing markets for its oil are in China and India. Trade between the Middle East and Asia has expanded threefold in the past two years.

'Cheney ... not running ... in 2008. So Mr. Bush has no heir apparent. And that explains, in part, why his second term is drifting aimlessly, disconnected from the problems facing the country.

... [the president] would have a more immediate incentive to widen his political base, to offer policies that would appeal more to the center"

.... Bush "is not thinking of the bigger implications" for three years down the road

... spending and tax cutting ... is ridiculously out of control

... there will have to be a huge correction after 2008 to get taxes and spending back in line.

... Bush seems to be governing as if he were on a permanent primary campaign against John McCain in South Carolina.

... his agenda, seems to be to cater to the far-right wing of his party - period.

... country needs a comprehensive strategy for reducing our energy consumption and developing alternative fuel systems.

... a country also deeply concerned about education, competition, health care and pensions. It is a country worried about how its kids are going to find jobs, retire and take care of elderly parents.

... the head-in-sand positions he has in opposition to stem cell research, climate change, population control and evolution - positions from which centrist Republicans are now distancing themselves.

... If Mr. Bush's hope is to make the Republican Party into a permanent majority party and sustain his legacy, he would have picked a handful of significant proposals to widen the party's circle - especially with the Democrats so clearly out of ideas. But instead of widening and broadening, by focusing on getting things accomplished that would benefit the vast middle of the country, Mr. Bush is catering to right-wing fetishes. '

'... whether the Civil War was necessary, never mind the more obvious "wars of choice" such as World War I, the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, the Korean War, wars in Vietnam and Kosovo, and the Persian Gulf War.

... a great American myth, voiced by John Kerry last year, that the nation goes to war only when there is no question about the necessity of going to war.

... Wars remain subjects of debate not just because their "necessity" is in doubt but also because their results are mixed. No war has produced unmitigated successes.

... Demanding unmixed results and guarantees against the unintended consequences of war is as unrealistic as demanding absolute confidence in the "necessity" of going to war in the first place.

... One simple answer to the problem is not to go to war, ever.

... One problem is that we always know what did happen as a result of war, but we never know what didn't happen. What if we had not gone to war in Europe in 1917, Korea in 1950, or even Vietnam in the 1960s? To answer such questions requires predicting, with only the conflicting and incomplete evidence available, what the world would have looked like had we not gone to war.

... Michael Lind wrote a provocative book titled "Vietnam: The Necessary War," ... that, even knowing what we know now, it was correct for the United States to fight a limited, losing war in Southeast Asia -- to "lose well," as he put it -- rather than allow a quick and easy communist victory.

... What would have happened if the Bush administration had not gone to war in March 2003? That is a missing but essential piece of the current very legitimate debate. We all know what has gone wrong since the Iraq war began, but it is not as if, in the absence of a war, everything would have gone right. ... address the question of what the alternative to war really would have meant.

... although for most Americans the question of whether the war was "worth it" revolves around the failure to discover the stockpiles that most believed he had, nevertheless the key issue, I believe, remains the same as before that failure: whether Hussein could have been contained.

... The most sensible argument for the invasion was not that Hussein was about to strike the United States or anyone else with a nuclear bomb. It was that containment could not be preserved indefinitely ...

... the effort to change the direction of the region was surely worth paying some price. '

'Washington has a simple solution to most governments it doesn't like: isolate them, slap sanctions on them and wait for their downfall.

... the real story in Iran is that the government has tightened its grip on power in recent years. Despite an unhappy population, the mullahs have shut down newspapers, persecuted nongovernmental groups and imprisoned opponents.

... (Libya) Once a key sponsor of terror, it is now opening up its economy, welcoming tourism and trade, presenting economic-reform plans and even talking about political changes. While all these steps are small and easily reversible—Libya is still ruled by a wacky megalomaniac—there is some real movement here. What's striking about these two countries is that we have had different policies toward them. Simply put, we have tried regime change with Iran and conditional engagement with Libya.

... For the average person in Libya or Vietnam, American policy has improved his or her life and life chances. For the average person in Iran or Cuba, U.S. policy has produced decades of isolation and economic hardship.

... regimes in Tehran and Havana are ugly and deserve to pass into the night. But do our policies actually make that more likely?

... regime change has become a substitute for an actual policy toward countries like North Korea and Iran...

... Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan .... these examples only prove my point. The United States had no "regime change" policy toward any of these countries, and it had relations with all of them. In fact, these relationships helped push the regimes to change and emboldened civil-society groups.

... Mao's China at the height of the Cultural Revolution? Nixon and Kissinger opened relations with what was arguably the most brutal regime in the world at the time. And as a consequence of that opening, China today is far more free—economically and socially—than it has ever been. If we were trying to help the Chinese people, would isolation have been a better policy?

... it feels morally righteous and satisfying to "do something" about cruel regimes. But in doing what we so often do, we cut these countries off from the most powerful agents of change in the modern world—commerce, contact, information.

To change a regime, short of waging war, you have to shift the balance of power between the state and society. Society needs to be empowered. It is civil society—private business, media, civic associations, nongovernmental organizations—that can create an atmosphere which forces change in a country. But by piling on sanctions and ensuring that a country is isolated, Washington only ensures that the state becomes ever more powerful and society remains weak and dysfunctional. addition, the government benefits from nationalist sentiment as it stands up to the global superpower.

... the sanctions destroyed Iraq's middle class, its private sector and its independent institutions, but they allowed Saddam to keep control.

... Look around the world today, and you will see regime change in places where Washington has no such policy and regime resilience in places where it does.

'... In a perfect world, the United Nations would be an association of nations that would:

- Be a court of global public opinion in which competing views could be heard;

....Many influential people say that the UN, as it exists, is too flawed for reasonable people to continue to endorse it because:

'The US ... position in the debate over expansion of the United Nations Security Council ... backing Japan and one or two other states for permanent membership, while effectively excluding Germany.

... months of speculation amid a high-stakes diplomatic poker game ... a united proposal set out by the "Group of Four" - Germany, India, Brazil and Japan.

... US position ... at odds with many of its closest allies. ... to pass in the UN General Assembly ... a two-thirds majority of all member states is required, ... could be enough to deny the Group of Four, and possibly lead to deadlock and keeping the status quo.

... US opposed the Group of Four proposal ... a "big bang expansion" that would cripple the effectiveness of the Security Council.

... The four states have proposed permanent seats for themselves and two African states to be decided, plus six more non-permanent members....

... US was "likely to support two or so" more permanent members, plus "two or three" non-permanent members, taking the council to a total of 19 or 20.

... long-standing US support for Japan, but ... no position had been taken on others.

... an open secret that the Bush administration was opposed to Germany ...

India is widely believed to be favoured by the US, plus probably one African state.

... debate on establishing criteria that new members would have to meet ... size of economy and population, military capacity and contributions to UN peacekeeping, standards of democracy and human rights, size of contributions to the UN, and records on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

There should also be a geographical balance, (Nicholas Burns) said. This would apparently eliminate Germany. The UK and France are already permanent members, although they also support the Group of Four.

Suspicions that the US would be content to preserve the status quo were heightened by its insistence that Security Council expansion only follow progress in a whole package of reforms of the world body.

The US places budget and management reform first.

... Schröder ... made securing a permanent Security Council seat a priority of his foreign policy early in his second term, but the likelihood of success has receded amid opposition, mainly from the US and China ...

The Christian Democratic Union ... said it would not pursue the goal of a permanent seat once in power. '

'This is the most exciting and heartening moment in Europe since the fall of the communist regimes. ... referendum results testify ... that Europeans still want to govern themselves.

... referendums has provided Europeans ... the chance to protest against the threat of pseudo-democracy in Europe.

... heated argument and high turnouts

... the proposed constitutional treaty draws attention to the single greatest risk involved in European integration - that democratic political cultures are being weakened in the member states, without being replaced.

... startling how the political classes of European states have acquiesced in the transfer of power to Brussels

... centre-right and the centre-left ... exclude the issue of European integration from political controversy - creating the impression among voters that the issue was too important for them to be involved.

... direct elections to the European parliament had failed to give that body any hold over European opinion

... The acceleration of integration since the 1980s and the process of enlargement have together created the impression in national electorates that power was escaping them. Of course, inflation associated with the euro, high unemployment and worries about immigration contributed to discontent.

... Europeans have a shrewder awareness of the difficulties of sustaining representative government in a union on a continental scale than do their political classes.

... the desire to reassert national identities ... is not the same as nationalist chauvinism or vulgar populism. ... an indefinite process of integration threatens to leave (Europeans) without boundaries - not just geographical ones but boundaries in the mind. Such boundaries are indispensable to representative institutions, to a culture of self-government.

... define limits to integration and so provide an acceptable framework for citizenship in Europe. ... giving teeth to subsidiarity - taking decisions at the lowest feasible level - ...

... Like the process of integration itself, the attempt to give it a constitutional framework has been too rapid and too 'top-down'. But that does not mean that the attempt is itself misguided.

... a right of exit from the EU ... establishes its voluntary character. However, in ... - how many rights should be deemed "fundamental" and the balance of authority between member states and Brussels - the treaty falls down badly.

... engage with national politics ... repatriation of some responsibilities to the member states. ... reconsidering bicameralism. ... a European parliament - election from national parliaments ... We should not forget that the first attempt to provide a constitutional framework for the US failed. ... (give) Europe time to reflect on what it wants to become. '

'Syrian radicals are crossing the border to join the insurgency in Iraq in increasing numbers. Damascus has cut back on intelligence cooperation with Washington. The Syrian government ... frustrate progress in the Middle East.

...(But) in the long run, Assad's presidency is Syria's best hope for reform, and because a nuanced approach to U.S.-Syrian relations gives Washington its best chance at achieving the outcomes it wants in the region.

... Bush administration initially adopted a good-cop, bad-cop approach ...

The two-track strategy yielded results. Syria offered valuable intelligence cooperation in the war on terror. Assad freed large numbers of political prisoners. His government helped the U.S. military monitor Syria's border with Iraq and passed a number of fugitive Saddam loyalists into U.S. custody. Unlike Iran, Syria has negotiated with European states, largely in good faith, toward a resolution of questions surrounding its weapons programs. Syria's border with Israel remained quiet. Hezbollah, Syria's armed proxy in Lebanon, curtailed rocket attacks on Israelis.

... Crucially, Syria ended its three-decade occupation of Lebanon. ... Assad kept his promise. In the process, he purged the senior ranks of the security services of several hard-line holdovers from the days of his father's repressive rule.

... Assad is now scrambling to contain the damage he's done to his standing with powerful members of the old guard. It's ironic that two of his most welcome reforms, the Lebanon retreat and the security service purge, have now pushed the Syrian president toward actions that anger the White House.

... Several factors limit Assad's domestic political capital. .... Assad belongs to the Alawite sect ... Second, Assad lacks his father's talent for inspiring both admiration and fear among the elite and the general population. Finally, many older-generation officials have never fully trusted him to protect their privileges or to maintain a hard-line approach to Israel and the West. Assad has gotten rid of some of them, but not all.

... Assad has moved to appease those among Syria's governing circle most suspicious of his intentions. Hence less cooperation with U.S. intelligence and the Syrian Sunni radicals filtering into Iraq. It's a calculated move. ... Assad believes Sunni radicals are less threat to him in Iraq than they would be at home.

... There is no question the United States should respond sharply to any Syrian moves to aid Iraq's insurgency. But what's needed is the more nuanced approach ... some carrots as well as sticks.

... There is reason to hope political and economic reform in Syria will continue and even intensify.

... Assad has, so far, made only limited progress in political and economic reform, but that is certainly preferable to what lies ahead for U.S.-Syria relations if Assad is shoved aside by the hard-liners.

... A more nuanced and patient U.S. approach has produced progress over the last four years. If administration hawks enable the hard-liners to unseat Assad, the long-term result will be bad for Iraq, for Israel, and for Syria - and it will be bad for the United States. '

'...(Khatami's) tenure is routinely being described as an utter failure.

... As with most things in Iran, however, the reality is much more complex than a cursory look would indicate. A judicious assessment of Khatami's tenure would give him credit for some major accomplishments.

... reformers' electoral triumphs realigned Iran's politics by making the public the indispensable actor of the nation's future.

...the restive ambitions of Iran's post-revolutionary generation, who make up 85 percent of its population.

... Khatami's advocacy of civil society and rule of law led the Iranians to believe that they have rights that cannot be infringed.

... during Khatami's tenure that Iran normalized relations with key international actors, namely the European community and Saudi Arabia.

... in 1997, there were almost no European Union ambassadors still in Iran.

... European trade delegations, diplomats, scholars and tourists are now routine sights in Iran.

... Khatami instituted a significant shift in Iran's Gulf policy.

... Khatami keenly appreciated that Iran could not harmonize relations with the Gulf sheikdoms so long as it did not come to terms with the most important of the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia. In a reversal of two decades of animosity, Khatami managed to reconcile with the House of Saud shortly after assuming power.

... ending Iran's debilitating isolation in a region critical to its strategic and economic vitality.

... a foreign policy that focused on expanding trade, cooperative security measures and diplomatic dialogue. Ideological dogma and propagation of revolutionary Islam were not only seen as inconsistent with the reformist perspective but of limited use in a globalizing age.

... Khatami is leaving an Iran fundamentally different from the one he inherited. ... "The genies are out of the bottles and the bottles that once contained them are cracked." And it was Khatami who first broke the bottles.'

'On the surface ... the weakness of the Iranian democratic movement and the futility of elections ...

... Beneath the surface, however, there are encouraging signs for the future of Iranian democracy.

... the ruling elite is not united. ... the campaign has been nasty and competitive, an indication that the monolith of clerical power is beginning to crack. ... Khamenei has allowed the press to publish detailed accounts of some of the Rafsanjani family's illicit financial gains.

While some analysts have posited that the divide is a mere rhetorical ploy orchestrated to create drama for the election campaign, the attacks have been so virulent and so personal that seems unlikely.

... division is not about ideology, but about control of economic resources and political power.

In transitions from authoritarian rule in other countries, a factional feud between different wings of the ruling regime was a condition for the beginning of political liberalization.

... Rafsanjani and Mostafa Moin ... have both made statements challenging the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and its current leadership.

... Both have even called for new limits on the power of Khamenei and his colleagues in the Guardian Council - a reform pledge that President Khatami never, not even once, made.

To varying degrees, both candidates have also claimed the mantle of democracy and promised political reform.

... both ... have promised to improve relations with the United States.

... normalizing relations with the United States is popular enough to be a campaign promise.

... The regime has also seemed genuinely worried about lower voter turnout. Moin was initially disqualified from running by the Guardian Council, but Khamenei intervened and allowed Moin in the race. This extraordinary move was, according to some, intended to bring reformist voters to the polls. Others have suggested that it was intended by Khamenei to take votes from Rafsanjani.

... a campaign of rumors, threatening dire consequences for those who do not vote. ... significant because powerful, stable, autocratic regimes do not worry about low voter turnouts.

... these developments are encouraging. Contrary to the claims of the regime and its apologists, the current clerical despotism is far from stable.

... Unlike recent votes in Ukraine or Georgia, this election will not bring down autocracy. But it may sow the seeds of discord within Iran's dictatorship and lead to a genuine democratic breakthrough sooner than most think. '

'... Rafsanjani's rehabilitation will be welcomed in Paris, London, Berlin and, most unfortunately, Washington.

... They feel that he - unlike ... Khatami - may cut a deal to give up Iran's nuclear weapons program. Such hopes are profoundly misplaced.

... European leaders have been eager to prove the value of so-called soft power: that supposedly magic mixture of diplomacy, economic incentives and cultural coercion

... Iranians have toyed with the Europeans, making agreements, breaking them, making more and then threatening to break those, too

... Rafsanjani .... reputation as a corrupt and power-hungry wheeler-dealer. He crushed personal freedoms and presided over a sharp economic downturn. ...a particularly aggressive phase of Iranian sponsorship of terrorism...

... in 2000 ... he was humiliated in parliamentary elections, finishing 30th in his district, and his political career seemed over.

His comeback is due not to popular demand, but to the machinations of the mullahs.

... scheming to make deals with the mullah of the moment is not policymaking. Yes, Iran is a thorny problem. But it is best tackled through a robust program to support the rights of the Iranian people, including imprisoned journalists and beleaguered women; of diplomatic isolation for Iran's dictators; of zero tolerance for the sponsorship of terrorism (even if this means freezing bank accounts, closing off borders and denying visas); and of more aggressive efforts to cut off the shipments of missile and nuclear technology and hardware into Iran.

... more potential value than the empty promises and false charm of the man known in Iran as "the Shark." '

... Rafsanjani, a true political animal at heart, could not resist the temptation to stand. He maintains that he has transformed into a pragmatist.

... Rafsanjani had to deal with the factional nature of Iran's polity after the death of Khomeini and the economic devastation caused by the Iran-Iraq war.

... The emergence of a reformist movement with mass support forced the clerical elite, Mr Rafsanjani included, to acknowledge the link between demography and democracy. With 70 per cent of the population under the age of 30 and with no memory of the revolution or its nationalising ideology, the government recognised that it was sitting on a ticking time bomb.

... Rafsanjani's re-emergence signifies an essential and often overlooked change in Iran's power structure - a weakening in the position of the rahbar or supreme leader.

... Khamenei ... did not want Mr Rafsanjani to re-enter the political scene. Instead, he wanted a unified conservative bloc of support behind the more popular conservative candidate ...

... Rafsanjani's presence in the election complicates the outcome

... Rafsanjani has abandoned his revolutionary ideals for national-interest oriented objectives. Potential rapprochement with the US ... now one of the main pillars of his campaign. ... economic liberalisation is another ...

... issues such as Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and ideological opposition to Israel ... Rafsanjani's more moderate political style.

... On ... Israel and exporting the revolution, Rafsanjani has decisively distanced himself from the revolutionary creed ... '

... 'No student of the former Soviet Union, such as Rice, bandies the word "totalitarian" lightly. It connotes an official ideology intruding in all areas of life, rigged elections whose results are guessed well in advance and pitiless intolerance of anyone who dares challenge the orthodoxy.

... Evil (as in, axis of), totalitarian — such words trip easily from the mouths of officials in Washington, but they do not always accord with reality. Here, in "totalitarian" Tehran, I can sit in a shared taxi and hear five people, all strangers to each other, lambasting the hypocrisy and venality of their rulers. Iran is often described as a "religious dictatorship," but it is nevertheless possible to buy surrealist novels that refer to drug abuse and homosexuality

... Most significant of all, Iranians are no surer of who will win the coming election than Americans were in November.

... The election will, indeed, be flawed ... mysterious bomb blasts ... Guardian Council's disqualification of certain obscure wannabes for simplicity's sake, the barring of all female candidates because of their gender is scandalous. ... Many Iranians — perhaps even a majority — will not bother to vote ...

... Nonetheless ... the lexicon of reform has been adopted by many of the candidates...

... Clearly, Iran is no totalitarian regime, but what is it? Is it an "emerging democracy" ... ? I would hesitate before attaching such a label to a regime whose longevity, now that Iranians' adherence to the official ideology has waned, depends on its ability to read and manipulate the public mood.

... Iran achieved its semi-democracy despite foreigners, not because of them. In 1908, Russian Cossacks bombarded the first Iranian parliament. In 1953, the CIA ousted an elected Iranian prime minister in a coup. Democracy is not Bush's to confer. It is Iranians' to win. '

AB Anayasası'nın uğradığı yenilgi üyelik ihtimalini fiilen ortadan kaldırdı.

... Bu durumda başlıca üç ihtimal var. Hükümet değişen bir şey yokmuş gibi hareket eder ve 3 Ekim'de müzakereler şeklen başlayabilir. Almanya buna itiraz etmez, ama müzakere sürecini iyice yavaşlatır. Fransa'nın gayretleri semeresini verir ve imtiyazlı ortaklık bir müzakere hedefi olarak açıkça metinlere geçer. Veya 17 Aralık kararının sağladığı çerçevede uzun müzakereler sonucu kendimizi üyelik yerine imtiyazlı ortaklıkta bulabiliriz.

Bir başka yol imtiyazlı ortaklığa baştan razı olmak. Bunun siyasi maliyetini hükümet taşıyamayabilir. Üyelik için bu kadar çaba sarf etmesine rağmen başarısızlığın sorumluluğu haksız yere üzerinde kalabilir. Fazladan imtiyazlı ortaklık şimdiki durumumuza bir ilave katkı da sağlayamayabilir. İmtiyazlı ortaklığı kabul ettiğimizi söyler söylemez içinin birden boşaltıldığını görebiliriz.

Bir diğer yol da Türkiye'nin AB'den üyeliğimize ilişkin taahhüdünü teyit etmesini istemek olabilir. Tatminkar bir cevap alamazsak, kendi irademizle üyelik sürecinin belli bir süre ertelenmesini isteyebiliriz. AB içi gelişmeleri izler, şartların olumluya döndüğünü hissettiğimiz anda sürecin yeniden başlatılmasını talep edebiliriz.

... itilmekten kurtulmuş oluruz. AB'de istenmemek, onur kırıcı olmasının yanında, bizi istemeyen ülkelere karşı halkta derin bir husumet yaratıyor. Yani AB'ye giremememiz yüzünden, AB ülkeleriyle, hatta genelde Batı ile ilişkilerimiz zor düzeltilecek şekilde bozuluyor.... '

... Though most Republicans are steering clear of the exit strategy discussion, a handful are joining in.

... with 2006 midterm elections approaching, members of Congress are hearing from constituents who are growing uneasy about the war. So a nascent discussion is emerging in Congress about America's involvement in Iraq and whether it is time for re-evaluation. '

... China and the US are continental-sized, individualistic, and profit-driven countries. Unless mass hysteria takes over the bilateral relationship, the search for profits should keep the relationship from spinning out of control.

... The prospect for a grand compromise is possible but unlikely.

... Outright confrontation, euphemistically known as strategic competition (i.e., an arms race), is not likely either. Competition for influence in Asia is likely, mainly through trade. China is still a low-income country and has to put economic growth above all other concerns. The US faces a huge fiscal deficit and enormous commitments in the Middle East. Neither is likely to seek a costly arms race.

... The tie-up between China’s production efficiency and US marketing has proven to be a winning combination. Japanese industries seem to win against their American competitors otherwise. Indeed, I see the combination to revive more US industries. '

Correction by New York Times 22 June, 2005 'A front-page article last Wednesday about a suicide bomb attack in Kirkuk, a city in northern Iraq riven by political and sectarian tensions, misstated the view of a conflict-resolution specialist on who should govern the city. The specialist, Joost R. Hiltermann, director of the Middle East office of the International Crisis Group, said the White House should ensure that Kirkuk has administrative autonomy, not that the central Iraq government should run it.

Police and security units, forces led by Kurdish political parties and backed by the U.S. military, have abducted hundreds of minority Arabs and Turkmens in this intensely volatile city and spirited them to prisons in Kurdish-held northern Iraq, according to U.S. and Iraqi officials, government documents and families of the victims.

Seized off the streets of Kirkuk or in joint U.S.-Iraqi raids, the men have been transferred secretly and in violation of Iraqi law to prisons in the Kurdish cities of Irbil and Sulaymaniyah, sometimes with the knowledge of U.S. forces. The detainees, including merchants, members of tribal families and soldiers, have often remained missing for months; some have been tortured, according to released prisoners and the Kirkuk police chief.

A confidential State Department cable ... said the "extra-judicial detentions" were part of a "concerted and widespread initiative" by Kurdish political parties "to exercise authority in Kirkuk in an increasingly provocative manner."

The abductions have "greatly exacerbated tensions along purely ethnic lines" and endangered U.S. credibility, the nine-page cable, dated June 5, stated...

Kirkuk ... Kurds, who are just shy of a majority in the city and are growing in number, hope to make Kirkuk and the vast oil reserves beneath it part of an autonomous Kurdistan...

Some abductions occurred more than a year ago. But ... the campaign surged after the Jan. 30 elections consolidated the two main Kurdish parties' control over the Kirkuk provincial government....The U.S. military said it had logged 180 cases; Arab and Turkmen politicians put the number at more than 600 and said many families feared retribution for coming forward.

... the campaign was being orchestrated and carried out by the Kurdish intelligence agency, known as Asayesh, and the Kurdish-led Emergency Services Unit, a 500-member anti-terrorism squad within the Kirkuk police force. Both are closely allied with the U.S. military. The intelligence agency is made up of Kurds, and the emergency unit is composed of a mixture of Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens.

... the problem extended to Mosul ... and regions near the Kurdish-controlled border with Turkey.

The transfers occurred "without authority of local courts or the knowledge of Ministries of Interior or Defense in Baghdad" ...

... 40 percent of Kirkuk's 6,120-member police force was loyal to the two Kurdish political parties. Acting on the parties' orders, uniformed officers carried out the abductions using the police department's cars and pickup trucks...

"The main problem is that the loyalty to the police is to the parties and not the police force" ...

... U.S. and Iraqi officials said the abuses were an outgrowth of Kirkuk's dysfunctional police force, a product of patronage and partisan loyalties....

Abdel-Rahman said he was concerned that the Americans were being duped by the Kurds, who he said have cloaked what is effectively a power grab as a crackdown on the insurgents. Their strategy, he said, is to bolster their alliance with the Americans.

... Blagburn, the intelligence officer, said that even though the Emergency Services Unit is largely responsible for the secret transfers, it continues to provide valuable assistance in the counterinsurgency. Blagburn termed the unit "a very cooperative, coalition-friendly system."

... The State Department cable warned that the abuses by the emergency unit threaten to "seriously undermine [Iraqi government] and Coalition efforts in the region unless procedures are established to enforce Iraqi laws with regard to the transfer of detainees."

... "If you could see our house on any day, you'd see that we're having funerals without the corpses," Ramadan said. "Children are looking for their fathers, wives don't know the fate of their husbands, and mothers are dying 40 times a day." Ramadan said he had "anger in his heart." "Tomorrow, I could recruit the entire tribe," he said. "I could block the street in Kirkuk and kidnap 40 Kurds. When you lose patience, you can do anything." '

- Kandil dağındaki PKK mevcudiyetini dağıtmak için bir askeri harekat düzenlemek şu sıralarda çok güç. Irak’ın çeşitli bölgelerinde direnişçilere karşı zor bir mücadele veriliyor. Zaten zorluklarla karşı karşıyayız. PKK için Kandil’e kuvvet ayırırsak, bu defa diğer cephelerde zaafa uğrarız.

- Kandil dağını bombalamak ve büyük bir ateş gücü kullanmak Kuzey Irak’ta istikrarsızlık yaratacaktır. Ayrıca Kuzey Irak Kürtleri bu aşamada ortaya bir de PKK sorunu çıkmasını istemiyorlar.

- Amerikalı komutanlar (özellikle CENTCOM’dan söz ediliyor) hala Türkiye ile ilişkilerdeki rahatsızlıkları (tezkereden başlayarak) üstlerinden tamamen atmış değiller. Her ne kadar Genelkurmay-Pentagon ilişkileri rayına oturuyormuş gibi görünse dahi, CENTCOM’un havası hala tatsız. Bu durum da, PKK’ya karşı bir harekat konusunda isteksizliği arttırıyor.

... Amerikalı askerlerin Kandil dağına baskın yapıp, aranan PKK liderlerini aramaya kadar gitmeleri veya istihbarat bilgileriyle, içlerinden bazılarını yakalamaları ve Türkiye’ye teslim etmeleri çok şey değiştirir. PKK’ya ciddi bir sinyal verilmiş olur. Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri üstündeki PKK gölgesi bir oranda azaltır. Ankara’nın sabır gösterme süresini uzatır.

Aksi halde, Amerika’nın Kürt sorununu elinde bir kart gibi tutmak istediği izlenimi artacaktır. '

... Bush, who declined to even host the prime minister for lunch, apparently as punishment for the Turkish parliament's decision not to let Washington use its territory to invade Iraq in 2003, not only rejected the request (on PKK), but insisted Turkey cooperate much more in isolating Syria and Iran.

Adding insult to injury, it fell to Republican majority leader Bill Frist, a staunch White House ally, to then demand on the Senate floor that the visiting prime minister "speak clearly in defense of our partnership and to dispel a wave of anti-Americanism [in Turkey] that runs counter to the last five decades of cooperation".

"Nothing is so fatal to a nation as an extreme of self-partiality, and the total want of consideration of what others will naturally hope or fear," wrote Edmund Burke, the British conservative. '

Presidential candidates struggle to convince disillusioned voters to go to the polls on Friday.

... reform strategist Behzad Nabavi - attacked by 30 hard-line militants ... taken by reformers as a sign of rising fortunes in a lackluster campaign.

Buffeted by public disdain and predictions of defeat ... reformers say that several "orchestrated" attacks on their meetings by militants prove that they remain a political force.

A recent, unverifiable jump in poll numbers for reform candidate Mustafa Moin ...

... But voter apathy and a partial boycott may foil moderate hopes. ... half of Iran's 48 million eligible voters are expected to stay home, disillusioned with the unfulfilled promises of democracy and rule of law ...

... "Somehow, inactivity and doing nothing is seen [by many] as the most effective way to struggle."

... only Mr. Rafsanjani ... appears presidential.

"Iranians are desperate for reason to hope," says a Western diplomat ...

Rafsanjani and his rivals have dumped the language of revolutionary Iran in favor of inclusive, liberal messages aimed at the youthful majority ...

... Khamenei, who is believed to see Rafsanjani as a rival.

"This is very unusual; there is no regime candidate, so we are seeing the fragmentation of the conservative bloc" ...

Many Iranians say they will boycott the vote to protest conservative success in blocking Khatami's reforms for years, and to delegitimize the result.

Pundits are predicting a second-round runoff between Rafsanjani and a hard-liner, or Moin - in which case those "sleeping" reformists who do not cast ballots in the first round might deliver Moin a surprise victory.

That risk worries conservatives, who are increasingly vocal about how four hard-line candidates are diluting the vote.

... conservatives, who have long equated voter turnout with legitimacy... . know that a very full turnout - with the voting age set from 15 years, and more than 60 percent of Iranians under 30 years old - would probably favor Moin. "If you want to make America angry, make long lines at voting booths," Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, head of the powerful Guardian Council ...

... Reformist strategists know they can win easily if reform-minded Iranians decide to vote ... that, though Rafsanjani consistently wins high poll numbers, his negative ratings can be twice as high as his positive numbers.

... "If we lose this election, it is very difficult for Iran to continue on the road to democracy," says ... a reform strategist ... "If the presidency falls into the hands of the conservatives ... it will be military totalitarianism." '

... "There is good China-bashing and bad China-bashing," Max Boot said. "The bad bashing centers on complaints about Chinese goods flooding our market. The fact is, their success shows a lack of competitiveness in our economy. But the Rumsfeld comments are good bashing, because China's rapid arms buildup is dangerous in a region with some of the instability of pre-1914 Europe."

But why should the United States spend massively on arms and China refrain?

"Because we guarantee the security of the world, protect our allies, keep critical sea lanes open and lead the war on terror," he said. "China, by contrast, seems to be threatening an invasion of Taiwan and could ignite an arms race that takes Japan, South Korea and Taiwan nuclear."

But why should China accept the Asian status quo, with American forces guaranteeing regional security? Why should it not embrace its own Monroe Doctrine and seek dominance in its hemisphere? "Because the Pax Americana in Asia, as in Europe, has been conducive to a half-century of growth, peace and prosperity," Mr. Boot said. "Things might be different if China were democratic. But for now a line must be drawn: An attack on Taiwan is an attack on all democratic states in the region."

... national security doctrine of 2002... "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."

... Rumsfeld wanted to warn of the dangers of China's ambition. But because a lot of people are tired of being told, or feeling they are being told, what to do by the United States, it appears that speeches like his may backfire. '

Democracy is best seen as the opportunity of participatory reasoning and public decision making - as "government by discussion". Voting and balloting ... just part of a much larger story. The ancestry of democracy goes much beyond the strictly confined history of some narrowly designated practices.

... The belief that democracy is a quintessentially "western" idea is often linked to the practice of voting in ancient Greece, especially in Athens. ... reluctance to take note of the Greek intellectual links with ancient Egyptians, Iranians and Indians ...

... while public reasoning flourished in ancient Greece, it did so also in several other ancient civilisations. For example ... in India, in the sixth century BC onwards, in the so-called Buddhist "councils", where adherents of different points of view gathered to argue their differences. ... the so-called "constitution of 17 articles", produced by the Buddhist Prince Shotoku in Japan in 604, insisted, much in the spirit of the Magna Carta six centuries later: "Decisions on important matters should not be made by one person alone. They should be discussed with many."

There is a considerable history of the cultivation of public reasoning, with good use of tolerance of heterodoxy, also in Muslim countries, including in the Arab world. When Maimonides, the Jewish philosopher, was forced to emigrate from an intolerant Europe in the 12th century, he found refuge in the Arab world and was given an influential position in the court of Emperor Saladin in Cairo.

To take another example, when at the turn of the 16th century, the heretic Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome (as part of the ongoing Inquisitions), Akbar, the great Moghul emperor of India (who was born a Muslim and died a Muslim), had just finished his project of legally codifying minority rights, including religious freedom for all. Akbar also set up in Agra perhaps the earliest multi-religious discussion group, and there were regular meetings in the 1590s of Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Jains, Jews, Parsees and even atheists, to discuss where and why they differed, and how they could live together.

... It would be a mistake to try to translate the immediate problems of Iraq into a larger case for rejecting the general possibility of - and indeed the need for - democracy in Iraq or the Middle East, or anywhere else. ... the narrow and mechanical interpretation of democracy is also extracting a heavy price in Iraq. ... while the recent elections were very welcome, in the absence of adequately open and participatory dialogue, the voting process was predictably sectarian ... similar problem in Afghanistan, with its easy reliance on gatherings of tribal leaders and councils of clerics, rather than on the more exacting, but critically important, cultivation of open, general meetings.

The requirements of democracy include the development of opportunities for participatory public reasoning ... ... the promotion of civil rights, including freedom from arbitrary arrest (and, of course, from torture), facilities for public gathering and fuller media freedom. It is important to assist, rather than hinder, the development of non-sectarian identities of women and men, and restoration of the self-respect of Iraqis as Iraqis.... '

... Baath Party Congress ... without the reforms many Syrians anticipated.

It's often said here that the secular activists represent the head of the opposition movement and the Islamists the heart. So long as the two stayed apart, they were little threat to the Syrian government.

... the weak and fractious secular opposition to reach out to their religious counterparts ...

"The secularists and Islamists are talking to each other" ...

... four-day congress ... was used by President Assad to stiffen domestic resolve against international pressure and demonstrate that the regime isn't about to collapse.

The congress ... was heralded as an opportunity for the regime to usher in a long-awaited reform package. The congress ... loosen the Baath Party's paralyzing grip on society, including amending an emergency law that permits arbitrary arrests, and allowing some new political parties.

"The regime is trying to create a united front" ...

Such a tactic involves the stick as well the carrot, however. Not only do the reforms fall short of what many Syrians had hoped, a wave of arrests of opposition activists prior to the congress ... government intends to deal harshly with any challenges.

Syria's secular opposition is composed of an eclectic mix of aging leftists, Arab nationalists, human rights activists, and intellectuals, some of whom criticize US policy in the Middle East almost as much as they criticize their own government.

Then there is a generation of young reformists, often Western educated and with a more tolerant view of US goals in the region. On the periphery are the foreign-based groups such as the US-based Reform Party of Syria led by Farid Ghadry, a businessman who has little support here and is dubbed the "Syrian Ahmad Chalabi" ...

... the secular opposition here has little popular standing or ability to effectively confront the regime and is riven by infighting and squabbles.

"They don't have strategies," says Maan Abdulsalem, an activist. "All they know is how to talk and write. They don't know how to organize effectively. They don't know how to reach out to the people."

In April... Muslim Brotherhood ... (called) for free and fair elections and an end to the state of emergency ...

... two Syrian secular opposition groups to set aside their misgivings about the Islamists and issue statements of support, setting in motion a potential alliance.

"Any reform process, to be successful, must have all forces, without exception, including the Muslim Brotherhood,"

The Islamists potentially represent a powerful opposition to Baathist rule ...

(Syrian authorities) watched the rapprochement with growing unease ...

"The Islamists are not involved in politics but they have the street ... The [secular] opposition is very weak; [it] has no legitimacy and no popular support. The threat [to the government] comes when the opposition works with the Islamists...."

Although the Muslim Brotherhood is moderating its political stance to broaden its appeal to Syrians, Islamic sentiment runs deep here. "The regime needs to acknowledge the Islamists ... Unless they are given an outlet to voice their frustrations they will move underground and present a challenge in Syria...." '

Potential for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline ... is not limited to the billions of dollars it is expected to bring Azerbaijan each year. Also involved is the possibility of forging a new economic and diplomatic alliance arcing through Southwest Asia that bypasses Russia and Iran.

... working to Israel's benefit. ... India's "deep interest in expanding bilateral cooperation in the oil and gas sector... specifically referring to the possibility of purchase by India of Azerbaijani oil transported to Ceyhan by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and then brought to the Red Sea through the Ashkelon-Eilat pipeline in Israel."

... 20,000 Jews who live there in relative peace ... a country that is 93 percent Muslim.

For Azerbaijan ... attraction of a relationship with the Jewish state and with the Jewish lobby ...

American Jewish groups too have often supported the country in Congress ... Heydar promised to repay by opening an embassy in Israel. ... promise is as yet unfulfilled ... could be forthcoming soon.

... Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov had developed a strong rapport with American Jewish activists during his service in his country's embassy in the United States.

... a desire to be aligned with the West, independent from Russian, as well as Iranian, influence ...

The new pipeline strengthens Azerbaijan's relationship with Turkey, and indirectly should improve Turkey's relationship with Israel ...

"There is a significant amount of Israeli investment in Azerbaijan, in water management projects, cell phones, regional development, agriculture and more. Oil opens up an entire range of opportunities... The possibilities are endless, and there is a huge role for Israel to play," he said.

... an Azerbaijan-Turkey-Israel "triangle alliance" ... appears to be quietly shaping up ... '

... "China may win the sprint, but India will win the marathon." ...

... Current straight-line projections of China's rise to power neglect developments and adjustments in other Asian countries, particularly in the region's two great democracies, India and Japan.

The "smart money" literally favors China. ... But what if they are pouring 21st-century dollars or yen into a great 20th-century power? Politically, China is ruled by Leninists who must maintain the status quo. Militarily it relies on a large, underequipped land army. Economically it has adapted and mastered Henry Ford's assembly line on a continental scale. Financially it hordes its cash, regulates its markets with zeal and defensively uses fiscal policy to prevent mass upheaval.

... Think Asia, not only China....

... "The yarn for a shirt you think comes from China was perhaps shipped from Thailand to South Korea for processing while buttons came from the Philippines. The final product was stitched together in China and shipped from there," the businessman said. "Revaluing, at any politically acceptable level, will not seriously change the final price."

... "... we need an Asia-wide exchange rate agreement, not just one with China," economist Fred Bergstrom said ... The Middle Kingdom serves as a platform to bring together capital, cheap labor and industrial technology from throughout the region and ultimately the world. China relies on this empire, but does not totally control it.

India, on the other hand, has set out to become "a global knowledge hub, with a central place in the transnational movement of knowledge and services," ... that India's comparative advantage lies in its large and relatively young educated population. Seventy percent of India's 1.1 billion people are literate -- many of them are fluent in English -- and about half are under 30.

... global demographic trends often ignored ... the galloping aging of the population of advanced industrial societies that will not accept greater immigration flows to renew their labor forces. Where do these countries turn when they have too few workers to meet demand for goods and services -- and to support retirees?

"The answer is to move information and services, rather than people, across borders," ... Shifting low-wage or knowledge-intensive jobs through new communications or other technology to areas where there are surpluses of educated and willing workers ...

... (Nicholas Burns) Speaking to a U.S.-European group in Brussels ...

"The greatest change you will see in the next three or four years is a new American focus on South Asia, particularly in establishing a closer strategic partnership with India . . . If you look at all the trends -- population, economic growth, foreign policy trends -- there's no question that India is the rising power in the East. . . . I think you'll see this as a major focus of our president and our secretary of state, and it will be the area of greatest dynamic positive change in American foreign policy." '

... But the leadership shortcomings of this rather vapid prime minister should not obscure the importance of his country. For centuries Turkey has been the pivotal nation in the Eurasian landmass.

... If we could get the likes of Iraq, Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia to construct political systems that were half as democratic and pluralist as Turkey’s, we would be well on the way to snuffing out the hate-filled ideologies of Middle Eastern tyranny.

... But the terrible truth is that we are steadily losing Turkey.

... feeling unloved in Brussels and Washington, and under growing pressure at home from those who favour Islamic solidarity over Western alliances, the leadership is looking elsewhere.

... In some ways you can’t blame the Turks. For years they have been told to get their house in order if they want to belong to a rich Western club: entrench their fledgling democracy with civilising laws and legal codes; withdraw the military from public life; be nice to the Greek Cypriots; promote economic liberalisation.

They have met these demands more than halfway... the Sick Man of Europe is up and about, and performing acrobatic feats to demonstrate its fitness to be a true European.

But the rewards do not seem forthcoming. ... Though accession negotiations will presumably start on October 3, no one seems to think they are likely to proceed quickly to EU membership.

... Increasingly, Turkey is looking east and south. ... Turkish officials talk about a foreign policy built on “strategic depth”, code for a reorientation of policy from the West towards the Muslim world, the Caucasus and even Russia.

Turkey is not lost. Not yet. But the needle on the country’s geopolitical compass has shifted sharply in the past few years. Its foreign-policy thinkers are aware that their country’s geostrategic significance is no less than it was in the post-Second World War world. They are starting to explore some of the opportunities it represents. For Europe and America, who strove hard to keep Turkey in the right camp throughout the Cold War, that ought to be worrisome news.'

American policy toward the world's remaining Ba'athist government is approaching support for regime change.

President Bush's top foreign policy advisers met last week to discuss the government of Bashar al-Assad, ... a tougher policy that would allow American forces or encourage Iraqi soldiers to pursue terrorists that escape to Syria from Iraq for safe haven.

At the State Department, the Bureau of Near East Affairs and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor have asked Congress for explicit legal authority to fund liberal opposition parties inside Syria ...

...the White House is expected to apply tougher sanctions to Syria, possibly freezing bank accounts of the regime's top leaders ...

... when envoys from the Arab League arrived for a State Department briefing ... Syria's representative was turned away from Foggy Bottom and told his government was not invited ...

...a more concerted effort by the Bush administration to foment the collapse of the regime, according to America's ambassador in Damascus between 2001 and 2003, Theodore Kattouf.

"My sense is that this administration is willing to roll the dice and take a chance on a post-Bashar al-Assad leadership if he is not willing to drastically change Syria's internal and foreign policies," Mr. Kattouf said ... "However, Bashar is not the regime, and his fall would not necessarily lead to the result this administration would welcome."

... anonymous Bush administration sources as saying that their "advice to Mr. Assad is to retire."

... an exiled opposition group, the Reform Party of Syria, to send out an e-mail proclaiming that the State Department for the first time had endorsed "regime change" for Syria.

... the Saudis, whom the Syrians fear might get excited about a prospect of a regime change that will bring the Sunni Muslims, who are the majority, to power ... '

.. the drafting and adoption of a permanent constitution, will be critical to the country's long-term stability. Iraqis face a dilemma: rush the constitutional process and meet the current deadline .... or encourage a process that is inclusive, transparent and participatory in an effort to increase popular buy-in of the final product. ... downsides to delay ... are far outweighed by the dangers of a hurried job that could lead to either popular rejection of or popular resignation to a text toward which they feel little sense of ownership or pride.

... Popular participation in and acceptance of the basic pillars of the new order are critical to its success and longevity.

... set up a realistic timetable for bringing in excluded sectors of the population (not only Sunni Arab leaders but also representatives of civil society), educating the public about the deliberations, and consulting widely among Iraqis on critical choices regarding their nation's political structure, identity and institutions. ... ensuring that the constitution is viewed as legitimate by all sectors of the population is a vital necessity....

RECOMMENDATIONS

To Iraq's Transitional National Assembly (TNA):

1. Announce now an extension of the drafting deadline by six months ...

2. Expand the drafting process by either:

(a) adding Iraqis who are not TNA members to the constitutional committee ... or, failing that,

(b) creating a commission to draw up the permanent constitution that incorporates the current committee and includes representatives of excluded communities and groups. ...

3. Set up a transparent drafting process in which the media have free access to the constitutional commission's proceedings and can report fully to the public.

4. Establish an agency that is charged with coordinating outreach...

5. Encourage civil society initiatives in support of the constitutional process, including public education and monitoring of the drafting process.

To the United States and Other Members of the International Community:

6. Refrain from policy statements endorsing a specific timetable ...

7. Channel all support of the constitutional process via the United Nations and approved non-governmental organisations.

To the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq:

8. Assist the TNA, the constitutional committee and, if created, the constitutional commission in setting up a workable eight-month timetable with a series of interim deadlines that reflect key benchmarks in the drafting process concerning public outreach, consultation and review.

9. Continue to offer technical advice to the TNA and constitution drafters both on matters of process and on issues requiring comparative expertise or consistency with international standards. '

... Various U.S. officials, members of Congress and the news media are attacking China's policies, from the exchange rate to military buildup, much of it in a tone implying that China is on some sort of probation.

...The rise of China - and Asia - will, over the next decades, bring about a substantial reordering of the international system. The center of gravity of world affairs is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

China's emerging role is often compared to that of imperial Germany ... the implication being that a strategic confrontation is inevitable and the United States had best prepare for it. That assumption is as dangerous as it is wrong. Military imperialism is not the Chinese style. China seeks its objectives by careful study, patience and the accumulation of nuances.

It is also unwise to apply to China the policy of military containment of the cold war. The Soviet Union was the heir of an imperialist tradition. The Chinese state in its present dimensions has existed substantially for 2,000 years.

Taiwan ... a potential trigger. ... if either side abandons the restraint that has characterized U.S.-Chinese relations on the subject for more than a generation. But it is far from inevitable. All major countries have recognized China's claim that Taiwan is part of China. So have seven American presidents ...

With respect to the overall balance, China's large and educated population, its vast markets, its growing role in the world economy and global financial system foreshadow an increasing capacity to pose an array of incentives and risks, the currency of international influence.

Short of seeking to destroy China as a functioning entity, however, this capacity is inherent in the global economic and financial processes that America has been pre-eminent in fostering.

The test of China's intentions will be whether its growing capacity will be used to seek to exclude America from Asia or whether it will be part of a cooperative effort.

Paradoxically, the best strategy for achieving antihegemonic objectives is to maintain close relations with all the major countries of Asia, including China. In that sense, the rise of Asia will be a test of America's competitiveness in the world now emerging, especially in the countries of Asia.

... Asian nations view their relations with the United States in terms of their perception of their own interests. In a U.S. confrontation with China, they would seek to avoid choosing sides; at the same time, they would generally have greater incentives for participating in a multilateral system with America than adopting an exclusionary Asian nationalism.

They will not want to be seen as pieces of an American design. India, for example, finds no inconsistency between its improving relations with the United States and proclaiming a strategic partnership with China.

China, in its own interest, is seeking cooperation with the United States for many reasons, including the need to close the gap between its own developed and developing regions; the imperative of adjusting its political institutions to the accelerating economic and technological revolutions; the potentially catastrophic impact of a cold war with America on the continued raising of the standard of living, on which the legitimacy of the government depends.

... not ... that any damage to China caused by a cold war would benefit America. The United States would have few followers anywhere in Asia. Asian countries would continue trading with China. Whatever happens, China will not disappear. The American interest in cooperative relations with China is for the pursuit of world peace.

Attitudes are psychologically important. China needs to be careful about policies that seem to exclude America from Asia and about U.S. sensitivities regarding human rights, which will influence the flexibility and scope of America's stance toward China.

America needs to understand that a hectoring tone evokes in China memories of imperialist condescension and is not appropriate in dealing with a country that has managed 4,000 years of uninterrupted self-government. ...

... relations between China and the United States may well determine whether our children will live in turmoil ...or ... peace and progress. '